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With the wide spread of mobile phones, PDAs, and Smartphones, M-Commerce has become a 
major application domain for mobile devices, unlike conventional wired networks, mobile 
devices allow the user to conduct online transactions regardless of the time and the place as long 
as there is mobile network coverage. However, online transactions require adequate level of 
security to insure the confidentiality, the integrity, and the availability of the user’s information. 
Security measures consume a considerable amount of energy and require more time in 
processing. 
The aim of this thesis is to optimise the energy and the resources consumption of mobile phones 
when applying variant symmetric and asymmetric schemes. This aim can be achieved through 
developing A System State Security Management Framework, SSSM, which will implement 
encryption schemes, symmetric and asymmetric, and will provide different options to enable the 
user to choose the type of encryption, the key size, and number of rounds of computation to 
optimise the energy consumption level of the mobile phone. This thesis compares the power and 
the resources consumed by the most commonly used encryption algorithms such as CAST, 
IDEA, Triple-DES, RSA, and AlGamal. This comparison helps to draw the advantages and 
disadvantages of each algorithm scheme used in reference to the security level it provides and 
the power it consumes. 
Implementing this mechanism will enhance the performance of mobile phones by increasing the 
security levels provided by the encryption schemes and utilising the limited power and resources 
efficiency. Therefore, confidentiality will be presented in mobile phones and variant encryption 
schemes, symmetric and asymmetric, and changeable key sizes and rounds, will ensure the 
authenticity of both senders and recipients depending on their needs as well as resources 
available. This research makes contributions in two major areas; the first area consists of the 
novel Energy Aware Encryption polices generated by this work, the second area of contribution 
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1.1 Focus and Approach of the Research 
 
The emergence of wireless and mobile networks has made possible the introduction of 
electronic commerce to a new application and research area: mobile commerce, M-commerce. 
Internet-enabled mobile handheld devices are one of the core components of a mobile 
commerce system, making it possible for mobile users to directly interact with mobile 
commerce applications. (Hu et al, 2005) 
 
Security is provided through security services (Khosrow-Pour et al, 2006). Confidentiality of 
Information prevents unauthorised users from reading the data and allows only authorised users 
to do so. Confidentiality is achieved through encrypting the transmitted data in wireless 
communication and maintaining the encryptions keys used. Authentication is another necessary 
measure which ensures the correct identification of the source message. As for the receiving 
end, Integrity ensures the data has not been tampered by unauthorised parties during 
transmission. The information availability is restricted to allowed parties by Access Control; 
The communication must be available to both the sending and the receiving parties when 
needed, while non-repudiation ensures that neither the origination nor the receptor of the 
information can deny the transaction. 
 
The growth of wireless networks restricted by the security level required by every party 
(Gutierrez, 2009). These requirements are determined by the organisation using the wireless 
network; financial companies require very strong security measures to ensure that their 
information are kept safe from unauthorized parties to maintain information confidentiality. On 
the other hand, Internet access points such as hot-spots networks only require legitimate users 
access the network without the need to ensure neither confidentiality nor data integrity, and in 
the case of public internet access networks, no security is required.  
 
Conventional or wired networks’ security has come a long way in providing Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Authentication, and non-repudiation. Wired systems are inherently more secure than 
the wireless systems because of the wired connectivity (Siemens, 2008). Threats such as 
eavesdropping, and port scanning, require the malicious intruder to be physically connected to 





However, access to wireless network, does not require a physical connection as the world the 
connection to a LAN is not limited by the requirement of physical connectivity; the nature of 
wireless networks increases the possibility of intruders to eavesdrop and conduct a malicious 
attack to such networks. Intruders can easily listen to transmitted packets through wireless 
interfaces, and allow them to inject malicious packets which might disrupt the network and can 
lead to the possibility of compromising the confidentiality and the integrity of information 
without even being inside the premises. Wireless Networks are prone to the same vulnerabilities 
affecting the wired networks, but the nature of the wireless networks compromises the security 
measures of those of the wired networks. In a study conducted by BT in 2005, they concluded 
that unprotected wireless networks’ security is compromised in seconds, and wireless networks 
protected by wired equivalent privacy (WEP) can still be hacked in a matter of minutes, (BT, 
2005). In addition, human’s error and misfortune compromises all security measures if the 
mobile device is lost or misplaced and found by malicious parties. Hence, the security 
mechanisms implemented for the wired systems cannot be used directly in the wireless 
environment. 
 
Security measures are provided through security protocols implemented at the transmission 
level, such as frequency hopping, and spread spectrum technologies, are considered very 
expensive to implement by users and organisations (Yahya et al, 2006), in addition to the fact 
that Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) (Kalligeros et al, 2002) are easy to break due to 
mathematical analyses developed in the past to analyse LFSR (Lablans, 2005). As a result, 
developers have drawn their attention to developing data encryption protocols such as the WPA 
protocol for security (Wong, 2003) which operates at the data link layer, IP Security (IPSec) 
which operates at the network layer (InterLink Networks, 2003), and Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) operated at the transport layer to secure transactions on the Internet (Entrust, 2007). All 
these protocols rely on encryption or encryption related mechanisms to provide the security 
services. Encryption in this sense is thus the backbone of security services. 
 
The protocols mentioned above sound familiar, because they were developed to protect wired 
networks, but their implementation on wireless networks have raised quite few concerns in 
reference to the limited battery power, memory, and processing capabilities of mobile devices. 
Thus, the need to study the encryption schemes and design an energy aware encryption system 
to tailor the needs of wireless environment has become necessary. 
 
 





In general, Mobile handheld devices’ features, such as mobile access, rapid network 
configuration, and lack of wires, make wireless networks particularly attractive (Karygiannis 
and Owens, 2002). The availability of mobile technology has enabled users to store their private 
data such as personal information, emails, bank account details, addresses ...etc. this has 
provided malicious parties a great incentive to consolidate their efforts to intercept wireless 
communication and obtain the data exchanged through these networks (Narula et al, 2007). Wi-
Fi technology is a broadcast radio technology that works on the same 2.4 gigahertz microwave 
radio band as modern cordless telephones and Bluetooth wireless devices built into many 
notebook computers. As a result, Wi-Fi has the same advantages and disadvantages as any radio 
technology (Kashi, 2004).  
 
 
On the other hand, Mobile devices have lots of components that drain the battery; there is 
energy needed to operate the diversity of available radios like ultra wide band (UWB), Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), FM radio, 2G/3G cellular radio transmitter and receivers, 
wireless LAN (WLAN), Bluetooth, Digital Video Broadcasting for Handhelds (DVBH) and 
GPS. According to (Chang, 2008) most of the power is consumed when the phone is used for 
making voice calls. The radio frequency (RF) part that transmits the voice to the base station 
uses power amplifier (PA) (Chang, 2008). PA consumes most of the power. Research is going 
on in this RF area for finding out the solution to reduce power. PA gets more attention from 
mobile companies worldwide. Apart from the cellular part, radio components like Bluetooth, 
WLAN, etc also consumes more power. For example, while using WLAN, the packet loss is 
about 30% which leads to lot of power consumption (Chang, 2008). From the use cases 
perspective, the other major energy consuming items of the mobile devices are the display, 
mass memory and application processor. In the future, the power consumption growth will be in 
local connectivity and imaging elements as the ad-hoc networks are expected to grow and rich 
multimedia applications demand high quality imaging. It is crucial to ensure that security 
measures implemented on mobile devices have a minimum effect on both computational 
efficiency and battery lifetime. 
 
 
Encryption forms the basic building block for various security services (Delfs, 2007). It is thus 
vital to analyse the energy consumption levels for encryption schemes and considering the 
various options which inversely affect the energy drainage like key sizes, number of rounds, 
layers of security, and the amount of data processed per packet. Knowledge of the tradeoffs 
would also help in designing systems that can adapt the security of the communication link 




further complicates trade-off in terms of power and security. There has not been any research 
that studies the tradeoffs between security of wireless devices and the battery power consumed 
by various encryptions of the algorithms. 
 
 
From the above scenario, firstly, we address the importance of encryption implementation to 
secure information against malicious individuals. Secondly we identify that the computational 
capabilities and battery lifetime limitations of mobile devices are decisive factors with regard to 
security strategy, as security measures require too many calculations which consume a 
considerable amount of energy. Thirdly, we recommend an energy awareness strategy to 
provide an adequate level of security to the mobile user with reference to low power and 
resources consumption. This thesis focuses on providing solutions to achieve adequate security 
levels for data exchange while minimising the energy expenditure within a mobile 
communication environment with requirements for low consumption of power and resources. 
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
 
Let us examine the main problems that we face with achieving an adequate security level of 
information and data exchange over wireless and mobile networks. If we consider traditional 
exchanges of goods or money transactions, security in such cases is achieved quite trivially.  
For instance, when shopping in a supermarket, a customer takes away the purchased goods at 
the time he makes a payment at the counter. When signing a contract, the parties involved sign 
the document at the same place and time, or use the solicitors as trusted third parties to make 
sure the contract is signed and exchanged fairly. In all these cases, fairness is achieved by 
exchanging the items simultaneously.  
 
 
There have been studies that compare the performance of some of the encryption and 
decryption schemes in terms of bytes processed per unit time or time for operation (Tamimi 
2005, Mancillas-López1 2007). However, there have not been enough studies related to the 
energy consumed by the encryption schemes in every day communication environment on 
mobile devices.  
 
Having analysed the transaction made by the mobile device user, we have noticed a common 
feature, when an exchange of encrypted data or information, the user relies on the mobile 




the efficiency of information and data encryption transmitted through mobile devices in relation 
to power consumption; in other words, is a secure exchange of information could be achieved 
by encrypting the information or data in a specific way in reference to battery, memory, and 





1.4 Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to overcome the lack of security when exchanging valuable information 
and data over the wireless and mobile environment and to develop an energy-aware security 
policy to maintain adequate security levels and non-repudiation services required for 
safeguarding M-commerce transactions while ensuring a low level of energy consumption. 
 
This thesis advocates a framework for providing secure energy-aware data communication 
while sustaining low energy expenditure.  A System State Security Management Framework, 
SSSM, adapts the security level depending on the amount of available energy levels, and the 
amount of processing time needed to execute the security policy. By ensuring these two 
services, we aim at helping business parties overcome the distrust and increasing the confidence 
while engaging in ad-hoc M-commerce transactions with other parties over the wireless and 
mobile networks, and increase their awareness to security and energy saving during a 
transaction when using mobile handheld devices. 
 
 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
 
(1) Review power consumption and management in devices used for communication in M-
Commerce 
 
(2) Analyse commonly used encryption algorithms in M-Commerce 
 
(3) Assess the effect on power consumption of various commonly used encryption algorithms in 
M-Commerce 
 
(4) Assess the security levels afforded by various commonly used encryption algorithms in M-
Commerce through the following suggested scenarios: 
 
– High security level: an exchange of highly important and confidential information or 
data by two parties, which can affect business ventures, together with its non-repudiable 
proof, where the aim is to generate a proof of reception of a specific text and no content 





This scenario requires asymmetric encryption scheme due to the sensitive information 
exchanged between two business men, this information can include bank accounts, 
addresses, personal information, classified information ...etc 
 
– Intermediate security level: an exchange of important information and data, but no 
direct effect on business ventures. This service is not required for non-repudiable proof.  
 
Symmetric encryption schemes are required for this scenario, as the information 
exchanged between the users are important but does not include business accounts, 
personal information, or any kind of classified information. 
 
 
– No security level Scenario:  General information and data are exchanged which are 
not potentially endangering mobile users if exposed. 
 
This scenario represents day to day information exchange between users where no 
important information is exchanged; therefore, no encryption scheme is required. 
 
 
(5) Develop an energy-aware security system to be used in M-Commerce that recommends 
appropriate security levels for various transactions and which allows the user to make the final 






Figure 1: Encryption Vs Power Consumption  
 
The primary challenge in providing security in low power mobile wireless devices lies in the 
conflicting interest between minimizing power consumption and maximizing security. In 
general, we can safely assume that by doing more computations one can achieve higher amount 
of security. For example, the strength of encryption schemes depend on complexity of the 
encryption algorithm, more complex algorithms produces higher levels of security at the cost of 
additional power consumption. For example Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
vulnerability and the power consumption in reference to the encryption complexity. Therefore, 
in order to design power efficient encryption algorithms for mobile handheld devices there is an 
inherent need to understand the relationships between power consumption and encryption 
parameters. Once these relationships are understood well then it is possible to optimize power 





1.5 Methodology Adopted 
 
The base of submission to PhD is framework which provides application and Energy Aware 
mechanism with dynamic balancing of encryption schemes and energy reservation for mobile 
devices such as mobile phones. This section describes the methodology adopted in conducting 
and evaluating this research. This includes studying and reviewing related research, analysing 
encryptions, designing and executing an experiment which will inform the design of the SSSM. 
 
In order to meet the aim of developing an energy aware security system for use in M-Commerce 
the following general method was used: 
 
1. Evaluation on power consumption and management in mobile devices through 
literature review. 
 
2. Analysis of  relevant encryption algorithms through literature review and 
investigation. 
 
3. Identification of M-Commerce scenarios which require variant levels of security. 
 
4. Design of experiments to compare power consumption of various encryption 
algorithms on mobile devices. 
 
 
5. Execution of Experiments. 
 
6. Evaluation of results. 
 
7. Design of energy-aware security system based on experimental results. 
 
8. Evaluation of energy-aware security system. 
 
The experimental and development part of this research involves: 
 
• Running the variant encryption algorithms on a laptop environment to obtain a 





• Comparing the results to those obtained from the laptop experiments, and creating 
reference points for evaluating the energy awareness strategy when implemented; 
running the variant encryptions by following the same order used on the laptop 
environment to measure the difference of energy efficiency performed on both the 
Smartphone and  PDA environments. This allows us to draw a conclusion on how 
efficient the encryptions are in the presence of a limited source of energy. 
 
• Developing driver software, written in C++, to optimize the energy and the resources 
consumption of Symbian S80, open source operating system widely used for 
Smartphones, mobiles, and PDAs , when applying variant symmetric and asymmetric 
schemes.  
 
In order to evaluate the results, three scenarios will be considered in this research .A suitable 
encryption scheme for each scenario will be implemented on a Laptop, a PDA, and a Smart 
Phones. The results will reflect the best possible energy saving scheme for each scenario, to 





The results obtained in the experimental work inform the design of the SSSM as they provide 
evidence of efficiency savings obtainable through utilisation of variant encryption schemes 
depending on application need. 
 
The flow chart for the software code suggested to be used is presented in figure 2. The battery 
and computational exchange of encryption schemes under different scenarios are considered in 
various experimental setups but the underlying setup remains the same. Initialization in case of 
encryption would be to establish the keys required. For the purpose of comparing their 
performance, a big file of size 5MB unless explicitly mentioned is processed multiple number 
of times. The flow chart explains the encryption process, where complexity is depending on the 
battery’s percentage. In chapter five, we will discuss in details the mechanism in choosing the 





Figure 2: Flow Chart for Driver Program in the Experiments 
 
Processing in experiment for encryption is to read data from the file, then encrypt the data and 
put it in another file. This process will continue till the battery drains to 30% of the lifetime left. 
We will stop at 30% because after that the systems alarm and data recovery mechanisms 
become active and the performance of the schemes change. After a few runs of processing on 
the file the battery life left and the system time is recorded. The average battery life consumed 





1.6 Organisation of Thesis 
 
The work in this thesis describes progress towards providing a complete Energy-aware 
Framework for Mobile Handheld Devices with the capability to secure the transmitted 
information and data using the various communication means. 
Chapter 2: Power Consumption and Management of Mobile Devices. 
This chapter builds upon a basic knowledge of power consumption and management of mobile 
devices. First, Mobile Devices limitations and Mobiles’ components which drain the batteries 
are outlined. Next an overview of battery types in mobile devices and the rate of battery’s 
development are addressed. Then power consumption and battery management are discussed. 
Chapter 3: Information Security. 
This chapter discusses the network security, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication. It 
also addresses the non-repudiation aspect of security. Next SSL, IPSEC, and WPA are viewed. 
Chapter 4: Encryption Algorithms. 
This chapter describes the symmetric encryption, and discusses three different types of 
symmetric encryptions, the IDEA, CAST, and AES. Next the asymmetric encryption algorithms 
are discussed with examples such as RSA, ElGamal, and ECIES. 
 Chapter 5: A System State Security Management Framework. 
Chapter 5 describes A System State Security Management Framework, and discusses the 
various components which affect the battery and resources consumption. And shows the 
determinants and policies applied 
Chapter 6: Methodology. 
This chapter shows the method followed and the experiment conducted to obtain the results, 
then describes three scenarios which are considered in this thesis. 
Chapter 7: Laptop Results. 
Chapter 7 shows the results obtain from the laptop experiment. A comparison between 
symmetric encryptions and asymmetric encryptions are drawn in reference to Time and Energy 
consumed. 




In this chapter, a complete comparison is drawn between the algorithms studied in this thesis, 
and suggestions are made to determine which level of security is recommended to the users. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion & Future work  








































Mobile devices have lots of components that drain the battery. There is energy needed to 
operate the diversity of available radios like ultra wide band (UWB), FM radio, 2G/3G cellular 
radio transmitter and receivers, Bluetooth, Digital Video Broadcasting for Handhelds (DVBH) 
and GPS. Most of the power is consumed when the phone is used for making voice calls. The 
radio frequency (RF) part that transmits the voice to the base station uses power amplifier (PA). 
PA consumes most of the power. Research is going on in this RF area for finding out the 
solution to reduce power. PA gets more attention from mobile companies worldwide. Apart 
from the cellular part, radio components like Bluetooth, WLAN, etc also consumes more power. 
In this Chapter we explore Mobile devices’ limitations, battery technology, and power 
consumption management. 
 
2.2 Power Consumption 
 
 
Power consumption is a restraining factor which limits the functionality offered by portable 
devices, mobile hand held devices, that operate on batteries (Hua et al, 2006). Functionality, 
high performance processing, battery lifetimes longevity, smaller size, and low prices, are 
considered leading factors in M-Commerce industry. Unfortunately, the battery technology is 
not progressing as fast as the digital technology or the increasing user demand. On an average 
there is 2% increase in battery efficiency every year (Koehler et al, 2005). Portable devices are 
also getting smaller and smaller, implying that the amount of space for batteries is also 
decreasing. Decreasing size results in less energy storage and a need for less power 
consumption. Users do not accept a battery lifetime of less than an hour; for wrist-watch-like 
devices even lifetimes of several months are expected. New, more powerful processors appear 
on the market that can deliver the performance users desire for their new applications. 
 
Unfortunately, these powerful processors often have higher power consumption than their 
predecessors. Finally, users do not only want more processing, but also more features such as 
multimedia, mass storage, always-on wireless access, and speech recognition. It is important to 
utilize the available energy within batteries as efficiently as possible to meet user demands. 




by all parts of a portable device. Sophisticated power management is an important requirement 
to increase the battery life, usability, and functionality of devices. 
 
Power consumption is the rate at which energy is consumed. With the fixed energy capacity of a 
battery, the power consumption directly determines the battery lifetime of a portable device. 
There is a difference between power and energy. The ideal situation is to maximize 
performance while minimizing energy consumption. Efficiency is the key to solving the power 
crisis. High performance with high power consumption does not necessarily mean less energy 
efficient and conversely, low performance and low power consumption does not mean that a 
device is more energy efficient 92. For example, a component may consume five times more 
power and deliver ten times the performance of alternatives. Such a component would double 
the efficiency. The primary concern is improving the energy efficiency, even if it requires that 
we temporarily increase power consumption.  
 
The power consumption of portable devices is not dominated by a single component. Several 
studies have investigated the power consumption of portable devices (Shearer 2007, Sorber 
2004, Pouwelse 2003) The main conclusion is that there is no single component or single 
activity that dominates the power consumption in a portable device. Therefore, the power 
consumption of all components needs to be reduced to lower the total amount of power. This 
section briefly discusses the problems and future technology directions for a number of 
components of portable devices (Vihmalo, 2005). These components form the basis of wireless 
multimedia playback devices as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The components of wireless multimedia playback device used in a previous research 
(Pouwelse, 2003) 
 
2.3  Battery Technology 
 
Batteries used in wireless devices are an essential component. The batteries used with current 




wireless devices there is a heavy demand for longer lasting batteries of less weight and smaller 
size. Unfortunately, the battery technology is not progressing as fast as the digital technology or 
the increasing user demand. On an average there is 2% increase in battery efficiency every year 
(Hallmark, 2002). In this section we will look at various types of batteries that are being used in 
today’s market. 
 
Various technologies exist today for batteries. Table 1 provides the characteristics of some of 
the existing battery technologies. Voltage presents the amount of power that can be delivered by 
the battery and a milli-amperes hour (mAh) is the time for which that power can be delivered. 
Higher voltage is preferred since if battery has lower output voltage then additional circuit is 
required to convert the voltage to higher values. 
Explain weight energy density and volume energy density 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Major Battery Systems (Delfs, 2007) 
 
Rechargeable Nickel-Cadmium (NiCd) batteries are popular for use in cordless phones and 
other moderate power devices. These batteries have a ‘memory effect’, which means they 
remember the previous discharge level when recharged and may play dead when they reach the 
state again. Hence it is required that they should be recharged after fully discharging. Nickel-
metal hydride (NiMH) batteries are less susceptible to the ‘memory effect’ and can hold more 
charge for the same size. They are popular as rechargeable AA and AAA batteries. One down 
side of NiMH is they have a higher self-discharge rate than NiCd .  
 
Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries are most preferred for devices like laptops and the newer cell 
phones and digital cameras. They have higher energy density figure, low self-discharge rate and 
quick recharge time compared to NiCd and NiMH. There are two types of negative electrodes 
used in Li-ion batteries: coke and graphite. Li-ion batteries clearly have many advantages but 
they also bring in certain complications in the device circuitry. They require protection circuits 




overcharges the electrolyte solution is decomposed and gasses are released increasing battery 
pressure and lithium is precipitated causing a rise of fire and explosion. If over discharge occurs 
the electrolyte decomposes and the characteristics deteriorate. 
 
In improving battery technology, there is greater focus on power management of these battery 
packs. Nowadays Li-ion batteries come equipped with a microchip that control charging, 
discharging and conditioning of the batteries. The power management system generally has 
circuitry for voltage detection, voltage regulation, switching regulation and battery protection 
(Shearer, 2007). For battery protection, it detects overcharge or overdischarge conditions and 
disconnects the battery. Overcharge is detected by over-voltage and overdischarge by under-
voltage. Charging begins with checking for presence of good batteries. For good batteries if the 
voltage is low (below 3.2V) the charging is done with low current. Once the batteries reach a set 
value they are charged through maximum charging current. The discharge circuit generally has 




2.4 Power Consumption Management 
 
This section introduces the major concepts in power management. Three elements in power 
management are identified and discussed: mechanisms, policies, and architectures. All three 
elements are described in detail.  
 
Power management is manipulating the components of a system to reduce power consumption. 
As already briefly stated in the introduction chapter, power management is important. For 
portable devices it will remain important for some time in the future because every 
improvement in power efficiency is countered by an increase in the number of features or 
performance, or in a reduction of the battery size and weight. We call this the power 
consumption balance principle. With a reformulation of the problem, the great importance of 
power management becomes clear. The improvements of features, performance, and reduction 
of the battery size and weight depend on power efficiency advances.  
 
A prime example of the power consumption balance principle is the mass market of x86 
laptops.  Power efficiency improved with standards for power management such as Advanced 
Power Management, APMand Advanced Configuration and Power Interface, ACPI (Fisher 
et al, 2004) in combination with more efficient policies. However, the power consumption of 
laptops has not decreased over the years. When more efficient hard-disk policies are discovered, 




model to increase storage capacity and to reduce access latency with compatible power usage. 
Every improvement in the power efficiency of hardware components themselves is also 
neutralized. In 1993, a typical display had no colour, a resolution of 640 by 480 pixels, and 
dissipated 2, but senior industry specialists predicted an aggressive improvement in battery 
lifetime. In the last two years, the battery lifetime of a typical laptop has increased from roughly 
4 hours towards typically 8 hours due to technology advances in displays and other components. 
A decade later this prediction has proven to be false because consumers prefer a light laptop 
with a high-resolution colour screen instead of a doubled battery lifetime. 
 
Power management solutions often divide the power management problem into more 
manageable pieces by treating each component in isolation. Furthermore, each component is 
managed by two entities: a power management mechanism and a power management policy. 
The policy determines the manipulation of a component and the mechanism contains the 
intelligence to do the actual manipulation. 
 
 
Figure 4. The relation between a power management policy and mechanism (Pouwelse, 2003). 
 
The relation between a mechanism and policy is illustrated in Figure 2. In the simplest case, a 
power management mechanism detects that a hardware component is idle and sends a sleep 
command to the power management mechanism of that component. 
 
A more advanced approach is to be aware of trade-offs in the components and to exploit these 
to improve power efficiency. Such trade-offs can be made explicit through a utility curve. A 
utility curve of a component specifies the relation between performance or quality, power 
consumption, and other costs such as wireless spectrum usage. Each point on the curve 
represents an operational mode. The metric of performance or quality can be multi-dimensional. 
For example, the quality of Wireless communication is difficult to achieve compared to wired 
communication because of the time varying nature of the RF carrier. In general wireless 
communication is dominated by high error rates, varying signal to noise ratio, noise variations, 
limited bandwidth and multipath delays. These factors lead to retransmissions and effectively 







Figure 5. The power usage with increasing performance or quality for three common utility 
curves, exponential (a), linear (b), and flat (c) (Pouwelse, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 3 shows three common types of utility curves. Figure 3.a shows the exponential type of 
utility curve where low performance or quality means significant lower power consumption 
than an operational mode with high performance or quality. An example of such a utility curve 
is a processor that supports voltage scaling. The difference in power consumption per processor 
frequency can be very large. The linear type of utility curve is depicted in Figure 3.b; a 
performance increase results in a power consumption increase of equal proportion. A 802.11 
wireless LAN card has such a utility curve; more bandwidth costs proportionally more power. 
Figure 3.c shows the utility curve of the flat type, where the activation of the hardware is costly 
and the subsequent usage cost is marginal. For example, rotating a hard-disk platter for one 
minute is relatively expensive in terms of power consumption; whether light or intensive data 
transfers take place during that time makes little difference. 
 
In principle trade-offs such as processor performance versus power consumption are 
continuous, hence the name utility curve. However, a number of factors (e.g. product cost and 
design complexity) limit the number of operational modes in commercial hardware 
implementations. For example, Intel has limited the number of supported processor frequencies 
to just two with their SpeedStep technology (Intel, 2000). SpeedStep provides simply an 
economy mode and a performance mode for the processor, reducing the additional complexity 
and cost of the processor to a minimum. 
 
There also exists an economic phenomenon that influences utility curves. This is called the 
mechanism/ policy interlock. In the highly segmented PC industry, hardware components are 
produced by a different company than software components. The hardware company is not 
strongly motivated to introduce new power-saving mechanisms when no policy exists to exploit 
them. On the other hand, a software company is only motivated to develop a policy for 
experimental mechanisms when a sufficient number of consumers have bought that hardware. 




phone where a single vendor develops both mechanism and policy. Parallels exist with the 
problems of hardware / software co-design (Pouwelse, 2003) where the hardware (mechanism) 
cannot be independently developed from the software (policy). 
 
The mechanism/policy interlock illustrates the close relation between mechanisms and policies. 
Policies and architectures are the main topic of this thesis, but without more mechanisms their 
efficiency gains will be limited. Future portable devices need both smarter policies and more 






Batteries are the dominant technology for powering portable devices. Unfortunately, the 
possible influence of a run-time power management policy on battery performance is limited. 
Power management polices help in maximising performance and minimising power 
consumption. This implies that a policy must have knowledge about performance and power 





































The internet is not a single network, but a worldwide collection of loosely connected networks 
that are accessible by individual computer hosts, in a variety of ways, to anyone with a 
computer and a network connection. Thus, individuals and organizations can reach any point on 
the internet without regard to national or geographic boundaries or time of day. 
 
However, along with the convenience and easy access to information come risks. Among them 
are the risks that valuable information will be lost, stolen, changed, or misused. If information is 
recorded electronically and is available on networked computers, it is more vulnerable than if 
the same information is printed on paper and locked in a file cabinet. Intruders do not need to 
enter an office or home; they may not even be in the same country. They can steal or tamper 
with information without touching a piece of paper or a photocopier. They can also create new 
electronic files, run their own programs, and hide evidence of their unauthorized activity. In 
This Chapter we discuss the Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, and Non-repudiation. 
Security protocols such as IPSec, WPA, and SSL are also discussed. 
 
 
3.2 Network Security 
 
 
Measures are taken in an organization to secure its data from attackers. The measures taken are 
generally not as simple as they appear to be. In developing the security of the system the 
designer has to look at the possible ways in which the systems security mechanisms would fail. 
The design of such systems also needs to consider where to place the mechanism both 
physically and logically. As explained in Chapter 1 the security services can be classified into 
the following: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, and 
availability. 
 
Security services are designed to prevent attacks that compromise the security policy of the 
organization. The attacks may be passive attacks or active attacks. In the case of passive attacks 
the attacker monitors the network connections. By way of monitoring the connections the 




the content of the message cannot be decoded that easily. In active attacks the attacker modifies 
the communication in some ways to his advantage. Masquerade involves the attacker assuming 
the identity of someone else. Masquerade is thus an attack on the authentication service. Replay 
attacks involve the replay of information from previous valid connections. The replay attacks 
can be extended further by means of modification of the information. The information content is 
so modified that it appears to be from a legitimate source. Denial of service attack prevents or 
inhibits the normal use of the communications services. It involves disruption in the flow of 




Confidentiality is intended to prevent passive attacks. To make the information confidential, the 
data is modified in such a way that it would be infeasible for the attacker to guess the data. It is 
achieved by means of encryption algorithms. Encryption is done based on shared secret 
information between communicating parties. Only the receiver and in some cases the sender 
know how to decrypt the data after it has been encrypted. The data is generally encrypted with 
an encryption key and can be decrypted by using a decryption key. For a symmetric key 
scheme, the encryption and the decryption keys are the same. For public key schemes, they are 
different. The key used for encryption is called public key while the key for decryption is called 
the private key. Encryption is further explained in the next section. Confidentiality in some 
cases also requires hiding the process of communication itself to avoid traffic flow analysis. 
Raju Ramaswamy and Manual Mogollon, (Ramaswamy 1990, Mogollon 2007) explain 




In authentication services, it is required that a pair of communicating entities establishes its 
identity. Essentially, the authentication service tries to establish the identity by means of making 
sure that a secret is shared between the involved entities. Some protocols establish the 
authentication through the means of symmetric key schemes while others establish it through 
the means of public key schemes. For the users of a symmetric key authentication system the 
communication systems share a secret key between the two communicating parties. 
Authentication is generally achieved based on challenge and response procedure. A popularly 
used symmetric key authentication scheme is Kerberos. Kerberos was a part of the Athena 
Project at MIT (Stallings, 1999). Rather than building an elaborate authentication for each 





Public Key schemes are slightly different from the symmetric key authentication systems. 
X.509 [Stalling 1999, Austin 2001) is one such public key authentication scheme. The use of 
public key schemes allows us to get rid of the dependency on the authentication server. 
However, the assurance of the public key is established by means of a certificate. In a 






As for data integrity, assurance is needed that only legitimate entities can modify the message 
(Mont, 2004). Encrypting the message to some extent ensures that the attacker cannot modify 
the message. However there is a possibility of some malicious user sending random data to the 
receiver. The receiver would decrypt these messages to some incomprehensible data, which 
posses the possibility of some damage. One method of avoiding such situations is to add a 
checksum to the message before encrypting it. If the decrypted message and the checksum 
match then the received message can be assumed valid otherwise it is considered invalid. Such 
a scheme would provide authentication and confidentiality along with message integrity. 
 
A variation to the use of checksums is the use of encrypted hash functions. A hash function 
takes a variable length of message, M, and produces a hash code, H(M), of fixed size. The hash 
code closely depends on the message. Small changes in the message result in a completely 
different hash code. The hash codes are designed to have high collision resistance. This implies 
that given H(M) it is computationally infeasible to produce M or H(M’) where M’ represents 




Non-repudiation involves the ability to prove to someone, the source of the document (Mont, 
2004). The originator then cannot deny that he is the author of the document. In this sense non-
repudiation involves both authentication and integrity. Symmetric keys are however inadequate 
in providing absolute non-repudiation even though they can provide authentication and 
integrity. The sender generates a hash code over the data and transfers it along with the data to 
the receiver. The receiver is able to check for the integrity of the document and it can 
authenticate the sender. However, the receiver cannot deductively assert that the data was sent 




the same key and can generate the same hash and encrypt it. A reliable signature scheme with 
symmetric key scheme would require a trusted authority that can sign the document and check 
the document signatures. 
 
With asymmetric key schemes non-repudiation can be achieved much more elegantly. Only the 
owner of the key knows the private key while any one can use the public key. Exploiting this 
fact has led to the evolution of the concept of digital signatures. Digital signatures allow the 
sender to generate a unique signature on the message that can only be generated by the owner of 
the private key. Everyone else including the receiver can verify the owner by using the public 
key but it is computationally infeasible for receiver to produce a similar signature for any other 
message. 
 
The digital signatures make use of public key encryption and secure hash functions. A secure 
hash algorithm produces a hash value of the message. The hash value is then encrypted by the 
private key of the user using the public key algorithm. At the receiving end the receiver uses the 
public key to decrypt the hash value. It also generates a hash value from the message it has just 
received. If the hash value generated by the receiver and the received hash values match, the 
message is authenticated. 
 
3.3 Wifi Protected Access (WPA) 
 
 
The WPA and WPA2 standards were created by the Wi-Fi Alliance industry group that 
promotes interoperability and security for the wireless LAN industry.  The Wi-Fi Alliance WPA 
and WPA2 standards closely mirror the official IEEE 802.11i wireless LAN security standards 
group but incorporate additional IETF EAP standards that the Wi-Fi Alliance considers secure.  
The WPA and WPA2 standards have two components (encryption and authentication) that are 
crucial to a secure wireless LAN.  The encryption piece of WPA and WPA2 mandates the use 
of TKIP or, because it’s considered to be more secure than TKIP, preferably AES encryption.  
From an encryption standpoint, WPA leaves AES optional while WPA2 mandates both TKIP 
and AES capability.  The authentication piece of WPA and WPA2 before the Extended EAP 
update called for the use of a PSK (Pre-Shared Key) for personal mode and EAP-TLS for 
enterprise mode.  After the Extended EAP update, there are now five EAP standards to choose 
from in WPA and WPA2 enterprise mode. 
 






Virtual Private Network (VPN) provides the leverage to use the Internet as a private LAN. 
However, with the flexibility offered, they also expose the internal network to outside attacks. 
Hackers could access confidential data by exploiting accounts or by simply exploiting bugs in 
the access protocol. To prevent the problem of direct Internet access VPNs are often associated 
with mechanisms that provide authentication and encryption services. IP Security (IPSec) 
provides the means to implement security at IP level. It ensures security not just for applications 
that have security mechanisms but also to other ignorant applications that have not implemented 
any protection schemes. 
 
IPSec provides security against open access, data manipulation, man in the middle attack and 
passive monitoring. IPSec has two functions by which it provides the security: Authentication 
Header (AH) to provide authenticity and Encapsulating Security payload (ESP) to encrypt the 
data portion of the IP packet (Stallings, 1999). IPSec allows systems to chose the algorithms 
and select the protocols used for services. The use of AH or ESP is defined by Security 
Association (SA). A SA is a one-way relationship between sender and receiver. Thus for two-
way security two SAs are required. 
 
The AH is based on the message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is generated by a 
shared secret between two terminal parties. The AH has a sequence number which is 
incremented every time the SA is used. This prevents replay attack. After all the sequence 
numbers for the SA are used a new SA needs to be established. The AH also has a value called 
the Integrity Check value (ICV). The ICV is a message MAC or a truncated version of a code 
produced by a MAC algorithm, which may be either SHA-1 or MD5. The MAC is calculated 
over the IP header fields that either do not change or have predictable change, AH fields other 
than the ICV field and the upper layer protocol data. 
 
With Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) the transmitter encrypts the payload of the IP 
packet. The data is padded to ensure the plaintext to be multiple numbers of bytes required by 
the encryption scheme. Number of algorithms can be used with ESP. These include the 





Figure 6: IP Security Packet formats (Delfs, 2007) 
 
IPSec can operate in two modes: Transport mode and the Tunnel mode. The Transport Mode 
provides protection primarily to the upper layer protocols. It is used for secure authenticated 
communication between two IP connected hosts. The ESP in Transport Mode encrypts the IP 
payload and optionally authenticates it while the AH in transport mode authenticates the IP 
Payload and selected portions of the IP Header. 
 
In Tunnel Mode the complete original IP Packets are encapsulated inside the AH or ESP to 
provide a secure tunnel. Thus the original IP packet is treated as payload and is not examined in 
the intermediate stages. Tunnel mode is essentially established to create secure communication 
between two network endpoints, which could be routers or gateways. In tunnel mode the ESP 
encrypts and optionally authenticated the entire IP packet including the inner header. AH in 
tunnel mode authenticates the entire inner packet and selected portion of the outer IP header. 
 
3.5 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
 
SSL has been originally developed by Netscape and has been accepted widely by the World 
Wide Web for Internet secure communication between client and server (Stallings, 1999). SSL 
operates above some reliable transport protocol like the TCP layer that is the standard for 
connection oriented communications over the Internet. It comes below the application layer 
protocols like HTTP, IMAP. SSL facilitates the use of Server Authentication, Client 




fragments the message to be transmitted, optionally compresses it, applies message 
authentication code, encrypts it, and transmits the message using services provided by TCP. At 
the receiving end the messages are received, decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled 
and delivered to the upper layers (Brag et al, 2004). 
 
A SSL session is an association between the client and the server. The SSL session protocol is 
layered and has two layers. One of the upper layers, the SSL Handshake protocol, allows the 
client and server to authenticate each other, negotiate the encrypting algorithm and the keys for 
encryption before the applications starts transmitting or receiving data. The upper layer is 
encapsulated by the SSL Record protocol. SSL session allows the use of multiple transient 
connections between the client and the server within on SSL session, which allows avoiding the 
renegotiations of the protocol parameters for each connection. 
 
The SSL Record Protocol provides encapsulation to the upper layer protocols. It fragments the 
data into data blocks of 16384 or less. A lossless compression algorithm then compresses the 
fragmented blocks. The compression algorithm may be specified as null in case compression is 
not desired. The compression algorithm cannot expand the data above 1024 bytes in the worst 
case scenario. In the next step a message authentication code (MAC) is computed over the 
compressed data. The compressed message and the MAC are then encrypted using a symmetric 
key encryption scheme. The encryption may not increase the content length by more than 1024 
bytes. The algorithm for MAC and symmetric key encryption can be selected during the 
handshake protocol. Initially the algorithm for MAC and symmetric encryption are null. (Brag 
et al, 2004) 
 
Other than Handshake protocol there are two other upper layer protocols in SSL: Change 
Cipher Spec protocol and Alert protocol. The Change Cipher Spec protocol consists of a single 
message called the change cipher spec message that is used by the client and the server to notify 
the receiving party that the subsequent messages will be protected by the just-negotiated 
CipherSpec and keys. The Alert protocol is used convey alert messages to the peer entities. 
Alert messages convey level of severity and the description of the alert. The alert messages are 
encrypted and compressed like other messages. The following alert messages are included in 
the protocols: close notify, unexpected message, bad record MAC, decompression failure, 
handshake failure, no certificate, bad certificate, unsupported certificate, certificate revoked, 









The availability of lightweight, portable computers and wireless communications has made 
mobile computing applications practical. An ever more mobile workforce, home working, 
and the computerisation of inherently mobile activities are driving a need for powerful and 
complex mobile computer systems and applications integrated with fixed systems. Mobile 
cellular telephony is widely available and computers are being integrated with these 





































Encryption forms the basic building block for various security services (Benatar, 2002). There 
are two types of cryptosystems: secret key and public key systems. In secret key schemes the 
same key is used for encryption as well as decryption. Most of the popular secret key algorithms 
are based on the Feistel Cipher Structure (Benatar, 2002). Encryption schemes like DES, IDEA, 
CAST, and AES use different kinds of transformation and rounds to achieve confusion and 
diffusion. In diffusion the statistical structure of the plaintext is dissipated into long-range 
statistics of ciphertext. Confusion on the other hand seeks to make the relationship between the 
ciphertext and the key as complex as possible. Although each one provides different 
mechanisms for encrypting data the basic security provided by the algorithm in today’s context 
is decided by the brute force attack and is directly related to the key size. 
 
Public key systems provide a radical departure from the secret key schemes. The public key 
scheme offered an elegant solution to the key distribution and authentication problems while 
using secret key mechanisms. Public key schemes are asymmetric involving the use of different 
keys for encryption and decryption process. They use mathematical functions known as the 
trapdoor functions to achieve encryption. The trap-door functions are based on some difficult 
mathematical problem. The IEEE 1363 (Goodman et al, 2001) document recognizes three 
distinct families of problems upon which the asymmetric key schemes can be based: integer 
factorization (IF), discrete logarithms (DL) and elliptic curves (EC). The popular schemes that 
use these methods are RSA, ElGamal and ECC respectively. Due to the computational cost of 
these public key schemes, they are generally used in conjunction with secret key schemes for 
secure data communications. 
 
4.2 Symmetric Cryptosystems 
 
 
The symmetric key algorithms also known as the conventional or one-key algorithms have the 
same key for encryption and decryption. For the communication between a sender and a 





Ek(M) = C 




E: Encryption function 
D: Decryption function 
M: Message 
C: Cipher 
k: Shared key 
 
Symmetric Key algorithms can be classified into two categories: stream cipher that operates on 
a single bit at a time and block ciphers that operate on group of n bits at a time. 
 
4.2.1 Stream Cipher 
 
In stream cipher a bit stream, which is pseudo-random in behaviour, is generated from the key 
and is XORed with a stream of plaintext to produce the ciphertext stream (Li et al, 2007). The 
receiving end produces the same bit stream that is XORed with the ciphertext to recover the 
plaintext Stream Cipher encryption can be represented as: 
 
ci = pi ⊕ ki 
where 
 
ci: ith ciphertext bit 
pi: ith plaintext bit 




Figure 7: Stream Cipher (Li et al, 2007) 
 
Security of a stream cipher depends on the period of the bit stream produced by the keystream 




algorithm produces an endless bit stream we would have perfect security. In reality the period 
lies between the two extremes. 
 
4.2.2 Block Cipher 
 
A block cipher operates on plaintext block of n bits to produce ciphertext block of n bits. In 
substitution cipher there is an input to output mapping of plaintext and cipher text. The 
substitution cipher for small block size is however vulnerable to statistical analysis of the 
plaintext. A large block size would make the statistical characteristics of the result infeasible for 
cryptanalysis but is not practical. The key for such a scheme is the substitution itself hence for 
plaintext size of n bits the key size would be n*2n bits (Delfs et al, 2007) 
 
Ciphertext 
Figure 8: Feistel Cipher Scheme (Delfs at al, 2007) 
 
Horst Feistel, a cryptographer who worked on the design of ciphers at IBM, proposed the 
concept of product cipher where two or more basic cipher functions are used sequentially such 
that the final product is cryptographically stronger than any of the basic ciphers. Feistel’s 
proposal of a cipher that alternates substitution and permutations was actually an 
implementation of Claude Shannon’s proposal to develop a product cipher that alternates 
confusion and diffusion functions; Confusion is basically defined as the concealment of the 
relation between the secret key and the cipher text, On the other hand, diffusion is regarded as 
the complexity of the relationship between the plain text and the cipher text. Shannon 




(Delfs at al, 2007). The Feistel Ciphers achieve a reversible mapping between the plaintext and 
the cipher text based on a key by diffusion and confusion functions.  
 
.  
Confusion is basically defined as the concealment of the relation between the secret key and the 
cipher text, On the other hand, diffusion is regarded as the complexity of the relationship 
between the plain text and the cipher text.  
 
In Feistel Cipher scheme the plaintext is split into two halves L0 and R0. The two halves pass 
through rounds of transformation and then combined to produce the ciphertext. Each round uses 
the output from the previous round and a sub key Ki derived from the main key K. Substitution 
is performed by round function F on the right half Ri of the data and then it is XORed with the 
left half Li data. Interchanging the left and right halves of data performs permutation. The 
process of decryption is essentially the same as encryption. Here the cipher text is the input the 
keys are used in reverse order and the output is the plaintext. 
 
 
4.2.3 CAST Encryption 
 
 
Carlisle Adams and Stanford Tavares designed the CAST-128 encryption scheme (Stallings 
1999, Shneier 1996). CAST- 128 has been published as RFC 2144 in May 1997. CAST has a 
classical Feistel network with 16 rounds and operates on 64 bits of plaintext to produce 64 bits 
of cipher text (Stallings, 1999). CAST makes use of keys that can vary from 40 bits to 128 bits. 
CAST Encryption scheme employs two subkeys 32 bit Kmi and 5 bit Kri in each round derived 
from the key. For key sizes less than 80 bits there are 12 rounds and for key size greater than 80 
bits there are 16 rounds. Decryption is essentially the same with the key employed in reverse 






Figure 9: CAST-128 Encryption Scheme (Delfs at al, 2007) 
 
 
Round (i) f1i f2i f3i f4i 
1,4,7,10,13,16 + XOR - + 
2,5,8,11,14 XOR - + XOR 
3,6,9,12,15 - + XOR - 
 
Table 2: Functions f1, f2, f3, and f4 in CAST based on rounds 
 
Here <<< represents circular left shift operation based on the value of Kri. +,-, and ⊕ represent 
modulo 32 addition, subtraction and XOR. The 32-bit value obtained after the circular shift 
operation is then split into 4 8-bit inputs to S-boxes S1, S2, S3, and S4. The S-boxes take 8 bits 
input and produce 32 bit outputs. Functions f1, f2, f3, and f4 play different roles in different 
rounds as listed by table 1. 
 
There is no multiplication operation in CAST. The performance of CAST can be approximately 
summarized by the following equation. 
 





Here ts is time for subtraction, ta time for addition, txor is time for XOR operation and tlshift is the 
average time for circular left shift operation.  
 
While implementing CAST the addition and subtraction operations can be easily achieved by 
using word size of 32 bits. Thus it can be considered equivalent to single operation. The shift 
operation may be available in processors like Pentium III and Celeron belonging to the IA-32 
Intel® Architecture have these functions as single operations although the execution time may 
extend over several timing cycles. The S-boxes are implemented as two-dimensional arrays and 
the input data maps to columns and rows of the array. 
 
4.2.4 IDEA Encryption 
 
 
Xuejia and James Massey proposed International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 
encryption scheme in 1990 (Stallings, 1999). IDEA was designed as a stronger encryption 
scheme to replace the then existing DES encryption scheme. The IDEA encryption scheme 
consists of eight identical rounds of processing on the blocks and then a final transformation 
function. 
 
The inputs to the scheme are 64-bit plaintext and 128-bit encryption key. The algorithm divides 
the input plaintext into four 16-bit blocks. Each round makes use of six 16-bit sub-keys to 
process the four 16-bit plaintext blocks and produces four 16-bit blocks. The final 
transformation round uses four sub-keys and has only the gray portion shown for a single round. 
In the MA1 block, two of the four 16-bit blocks input to the rounds undergo modulo addition 
with two sub-keys and other two undergo modulo multiplication. The four intermediate 16-bits 
blocks are then combined to produce two 16 bit blocks which go as inputs to MA2 structure. 
The MA2 structure uses two keys to transform these two blocks using addition and 
multiplication operations and produces two 16-bit output blocks. These two blocks are 
combined with the intermediate four blocks using XOR function to produce the round output. In 
every round the second and the third 16-bit blocks are switched at the output to make the 
algorithm more resistant to cryptanalysis. The final transformation consists of only the MA1 
block of the rounds. This is done to make the algorithm symmetric so that the same code can be 






Figure 10: IDEA Encryption Scheme (Delfs at al, 2007) 
 
Subkeys k1-k8 are directly taken from the 128 bit key with k1 being the first 16 bits to k8 being 
the last 16 bits of the key. Then a 25 bit circular left shift is performed on the key and next 8 
subkeys are generated. The procedure is repeated till 52 sub-keys are generated. 
 
The process of decryption is essentially the same as encryption. The only difference is the input 
to decryption is the ciphertext and the sub-key generation is slightly changed. The first four 
keys are generated from the keys that were input to the transformation phase. The first and the 
fourth subkeys are multiplicative inverse of k49 and k52 while second and third subkeys are 
additive inverse of k50 and k51. For every other round the subkeys derived are multiplicative 
and additive inverse of the corresponding 10-i round. 
 
Computationally the most intensive operation in IDEA is the multiplication. Every round 
requires 4 16-bit multiplication operations in addition to 4 addition and 6 XOR operations. 
 
Processing time = 34 * tm + 34 * ta + 48 * txor 
 
Here tm is time for single multiplication; ta time for addition; and txor is time for XOR operation. 
For processors not capable of 32-bit multiplication the multiplication step can be improved by 





4.2.5 AES Encryption 
 
The Rijndael algorithm designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen was selected on October 
2, 2000 by NIST as AES standard to replace the previous DES scheme for symmetric key 
encryption (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001). Although the original 
submission had provisions for variable length input blocks, AES takes 128-bits plaintext input 
and produces 128-bit cipher text output. The scheme can have three key sizes 128, 192 and 256. 
The key scheduling algorithm of AES takes the cipher key and produced 4 * (Nr + 1) words, 
where Nr represents number of rounds. These words are called the key schedule words. The 
plaintext goes through 10 rounds for 128-bit key, 12 rounds for 192-bit key and 14 rounds for 
256-bit key. All except for the last round are identical. Figure 8 below depicts the AES 
Encryption Scheme for 128 bits key. 
 
In AES, the state word represents the two-dimensional array of bytes to be processed by the 
round. The bytes of the block are arranged in a two dimensional array of bytes. Since for AES 
the block size is fixed the bytes are arranged in two-dimensional array of four bytes and four 
columns. A 32-bit word maps to the columns of the state, where the most significant byte maps 






Figure 11: AES Encryption Scheme with 128 bits key (Delfs et al, 2007) 
 
The addition and multiplication operations in AES are slightly different from the conventional 
operations. The bytes are treated as polynomial where the bits represent the coefficients of the 
polynomial. Addition represents modulo 2 additions i.e., the XOR function. The multiplication 
is performed by polynomial multiplication modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 8. For 
AES the irreducible polynomial is represented as: 
 
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 
 
 
The modular reduction ensures that the result will be a binary polynomial of degree less than 8 
and can be represented as a byte. 
 
AES also makes use of four term polynomials of the form: 
 
a(x) = a3x3 + a2x2 + a1x1 + a0 
 
Note that the polynomial here is different from the one before as the coefficients represent bytes 
of a word rather than bits of bytes. The multiplication of four-term polynomial is achieved but 
the addition and multiplication operations explained above and then reduce the result modulo a 
polynomial of degree 4. The polynomial for AES is x4 + 1. The polynomial x4 + 1 is not an 
irreducible polynomial in GF(28); however, AES specifies fixed four term polynomial that do 
have and inverse. 
 
The AES scheme employs 4 fundamental functions to achieve confusion and diffusion of data. 
The functions are SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. SubBytes is a 
substitution table (S-box) transformation of the state. The S-box, which is invertible, operates 
independently on each byte of the state. In ShiftRows the rows of the state are cyclically shifted 
by r-1 bytes, where r represents the row number. Thus the first row is not shifted at all; the 
second row is shifted by one byte; the third by two bytes and the fourth by 3 bytes.  
 
In MixColumns the columns of the state are considered are four term polynomials and 
multiplied modulo x4 + 1 with the fixed polynomial a(x) given as: 
 





In AddRoundKey the columns of the state are treated as words and are XORed with the key 
schedule words. Since it is an XOR operation AddRoundKey function is inverse of itself when 
applied again to the transformed word. For AES the function can be represented as: 
 
[S’0,c ,s’1,c , s’2,c ,s’3,c] = [s0,c ,s1,c , s2,c ,s3,c] ⊕ [wround*4 + c] 
 
The decryption process is similar to encryption. Here inverse functions InvSubBytes, 
InvShiftRows, and InvMixColumns are used in place SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns 
respectively. The InvShiftRows operated before InvSubBytes and AddRoundKey before 
InvMixColumns in the rounds. This assures that the order of operations applied during 
encryption process is applied in reverse. 
 
The proposal of Rijndael, (Yan, 2002) provides details on the implementation of AES for a 32-
bit processor. Accordingly different steps of the round can be combined in a single set of table 
lookups, allowing for very fast implementation. Each cell of the state can be separated and 
treated differently. Accordingly the transformations in the rounds can be expressed as  
 
ej = T0[s0,,j] ⊕ T1[s1,j-1] ⊕ T2[s2,j-2] ⊕ T3[s3,j-3] ⊕wround*4 + c 
 
Here T0 to T3 represent look up tables and ej represents the jth column of the output state. Other 
notations represent the same terms as explained above. Thus the AES implementation can be 
done by means of about 12 rotate byte operations and 16 XOR operations per round. Processing 
time can be summarized as follows: 
 
Processing time for AES 128 bit key = 120 trotByte + 164 txor 
 
Processing time for AES 192 bit key = 144 trotByte + 196 txor 
 
Processing time for AES 256 bit key = 168 trotByte + 226 txor 
 
Here trotByte is time for single rotate byte operation and txor is time for XOR operation. 
 
 
4.3 Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems 
 
 
Public key Schemes are called asymmetric key systems because they use two separate keys: one 




solving the key distribution problem of Conventional or Symmetric key systems. In symmetric 
key systems, the same key must be shared by the sender and the receiver and must be protected 
from others. Also, frequent changes in the key are advised to limit the amount of the data that 
would be compromised in case a key is revealed. Hence the security of the system is highly 
restricted by the security of the key distribution scheme. For Conventional scheme the possible 
way of key distribution is through physical transmission of the key or through the use of a key 
distribution center. The problem is further magnified by the fact that each connection should 
have a separate set of keys. This means that if there are n hosts communicating with each other 
than they would require n(n-1)/2 keys for independent secure communication between hosts. 
 
Public key schemes solve this problem. The structure of public key systems allows two different 
keys for encryption and decryption. Hence for a sender to communicate with a receiver, the 
sender uses the public key of the receiver to encrypt the data being sent. Only the receiver has 
the key to decrypt the data. Thus we no longer need n(n-1)/2 key between n hosts and the 
number of keys required comes down to n. The receiver can publish his public key openly and 
any sender can use it to send secure data to the receiver. The receiver can at any time change its 
private key and publish the corresponding new public key in place of the old one to maintain the 
security of the system. 
 
The question that comes to mind with this solution is why then should we use the conventional 
encryption systems. The reason why the conventional schemes are still very popular is because 
the public key cryptosystems due to their nature are very slow in encrypting and decrypting 
data. In fact, they are so slow that most of the modern day systems make use of a combinational 
scheme, which makes use of the public key schemes to exchange the secret key for the 
symmetric key scheme, which is actually used to transfer secure data. 
 
A public key crypto system relies on non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithms. During 
encryption the message is converted from an easy instance to difficult instance through 
encryption key. Decryption converts the difficult instance to an easy instance by using the 
decryption key. The algorithms are so designed, given a difficult instance, the only way to find 
the easy instance without the decryption key can be best evaluated through non-deterministic 
methods. A non-deterministic algorithm involved guessing the solution and then verifying that 
solution to be correct. There is no known polynomial time solution for the problems and it is 
assumed that a polynomial time solution doesn’t exist (Kuo et al, 2002). In other words it is 
assumed that there is no deterministic solution to the difficult problem. Such non-deterministic 
problems can only be solved in exponential time. The RSA, ElGamal and elliptic curve 





4.3.1 RSA Encryption 
 
 
The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme is a block cipher scheme in which the plaintext and 
the ciphertext are integer between 0 and n-1 for some n. The RSA scheme is developed using 
the exponentiation. In RSA, the keys are generated by selecting two large prime numbers p and 
q and their product is calculated as: 
 
n = p * q 
 
We calculate then Ø(n) as: 
 
Ø(n) = (p-1) * (q-1) 
 
Ø(n) is also called the Euler’s totient function (Delfs et al, 2007), which is the number of 
integers less than n and relatively prime to n. Next a number, e, is selected is selected that is 
relatively prime to Ø(n) i.e., Greatest Common Divisor, GCD, of e and Ø(n) is 1. Then the 
multiplicative inverse of e is calculated using the Euclidean algorithm such that: 
 
e*d = 1 mod Ø(n)  
or  
d = e-1 mod Ø(n) 
 
The numbers e, n form the public key and d, n forms the private key. p, q and Ø(n) are 
discarded but never revealed. Size of n refers to the size of the key in RSA. e is generally 
chosen to be small, as the value of e is not known to affect the security of the scheme when 
proper encoding schemes are used (IEEE P1363, 2001). Typical values of e in use are 3, 17 and 
216+1. Although no particular attack with the context of RSA with Optimal Asymmetric 
Encryption Padding (OAEP) (RSA Laboratories, 2000) has been detected with the use of e=3 
the more conservative users prefer using public exponents larger than 3. The RSA problem can 
be solved fastest by the integer factorization method. Moreover systems can be designed to have 
a constant value for e so that e need not be transmitted. Size of d is approximately the same as 





To encrypt a message, the message is broken into small numbers, Mi, less than n. Let us call 
these message blocks. These numbers are raised to power e modulo n to obtain the cipher block, 
Ci: 
 
Ci = Mi e mod n 
 
This is assuming the fact that it is mathematically difficult to determine Mi given Ci. To decrypt 
the cipher blocks are again raised to power d mod n to obtain the corresponding message 
blocks. 
 
Ci d mod n  = (Mi e)d mod n 
= Mied mod n 
= Mi1modØ(n) mod n 
= Mi 
 
Normally an encoding scheme is applied before encrypting the message for security purpose. 
The encoding scheme maps the message to and encoded message with some randomness that 
can be reversed for decryption of message based on the encoding parameters. The 
recommended encoding mechanism of RSA is Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding 
(OAEP) (RSA Laboratories, 2000). 
 
Both encryption and decryption in RSA involve raising an integer to another integer mod n. 
Since the integers are large numbers, if the exponentiation is done before modulo operation the 
size of the intermediate result would be very large. To make it practical to implement the RSA 
algorithm the following property of modular arithmetic is exploited. 
 
  (a mod n)* (b mod n) = (a * b) mod n 
 
Using this property along with successive multiplication scheme it is possible to compute xe 
with less than (e-1) multiplications. For example x32 can be computed by computing the 
following intermediate results: x, x2, x4, x8, x16, x32. Here the result could be obtained in 5 
multiplications instead of 31. 
 
Successive multiplication can be applied to any exponent and can be evaluated on an average in 
1.5 * k multiplications, where k is the size in bits of the exponent. For multiplication of to larger 




runtime for the multiplication algorithm is proportional to O(N2) where N is the size in bits of 
modulus n. 
 
Thus total run-time of encryption can be estimated as follows: 
 
Processing time for encryption = 1.5 * k * O(N2) 
 
For decryption, the operation is made further efficient by using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT) (Stallings, 1999). According to CRT, M = Cid mod n can be calculated from the 
residues Mp = Cid mod p and Mq = Cid mod q since n = p*q. This allows reducing the 
computational time but reducing the modulus bit size to half. 
 
 
4.3.2 ElGamal Encryption 
 
The ElGamal Scheme (Schneier 1996, Stallings 1999, IEEE 2001, Cryptopp 2009,) is based on 
the discrete logarithm problem proposed by T. ElGamal in 1985. It is based on the Diffie-
Hellman scheme. The ElGamal scheme uses randomization hence the same message block can 
produce different ciphertext block for a given public key. 
 
For generating a key pair, first a large prime number p is chosen along with two other random 
numbers, g the generator and x, both less than p. Next we calculate y as: 
 
y = gx mod p 
 
The discrete logarithm problem states that given y, and p it is computationally difficult to 
determine the value of x. The public key is y, g, and p.  x is the private key. The key size refers 
to size of p in bits. For ElGamal scheme it is possible to use a generator g such that the group 
generated by g belongs to the subgroup of the order r. For details of groups, prime field and 
order of group refer (Stallings 1999, IEEE 2001). For the purpose of our discussion subgroup 
with order r represents the maximum unique modulo p numbers that can be generated by 
successive exponentiation of the generator g. r is a prime divisor of p-1 by definitions of 
subgroup. The private key x is chosen to be in the range 1 to r-1. The use of subgroup allows 
the use of short keys for exponentiation in ElGamal improving the overall performance of the 
scheme. The best known solution to the discrete logarithm problem is the Generalized Number 
Field Sieve (GNFS) (IEEE 2001) which has an asymptotic run time of exp(((1.923 + o(1)) 




chosen such that the brute force on the exponent takes more time than GNFS algorithm. The 
sizes of exponent chosen for security purpose are as follows: 
 
 
Table 3: Short Exponent size for ElGamal encryption and decryption (Crypto++, 2009) 
 
To encrypt a message block, the message block is mapped to a number in the range 2 to p-1. 
Then a random number, k, in the range 2 to r-1 is chosen (in case short exponents are not used k 
and r in the range 1 to p-1). We then compute the following two values 
 
C1i = gk mod p 
 
 C2i = (yk * Mi) mod p 
 
 
C1i and C2i form the ciphertext. To decrypt the message the following calculation is done: 
 
C1i-x * C2i  = g-kx * (yk * Mi) mod p 
= g-kx * gkx * Mi mod p 
= Mi 
 
The processing time for ElGamal for RSA is about the same equation as for RSA. However, in 
case of ElGamal it is possible to do pre-computation of values of the intermediate results: x1 x2, 
x4, x8, x16, x32 for generator g and public key y for the successive multiplication operation based 
on k to speed up the process of encryption. This can be done because the value of the base, i.e, g 
and y, remain the same. 
 
 
4.3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Encryption 
 
The standardized Elliptic Curve Cryptography scheme, ECC, considered in this document is 
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). It is also Diffie-Hellman based scheme. 
The complete standard is specified in the IEEE P1363a draft (IEEE, 2001) . The underlying 




elliptic curve arithmetic along with symmetric key schemes, message authentication code, and 
cryptographic hash functions to achieve a hybrid asymmetric encryption scheme.  
 
Elliptic curves are not ellipses but are called so because they are described by cubic equations 
similar to those used for calculating the circumference of an ellipse. Elliptic curves of use in 
cryptosystems are normally of the form: 
 
y2 = (x3 + a*x + b) mod p  ; where (4a3 + 27b2) ≠ 0 
 
Here, a and b are all real numbers and p is large prime number. For elliptic curves we are 
interested in points in the first quadrant from (0, 0) up to (p-1, p-1) that satisfy the mod p 
equation. Elliptic curves also include a point, O, called the identity point or zero point. The 
number of point on the curve is called the order of the curve and is represented as #E. A point, 
G, is selected on the curve which is the generator point. Let the order of this point be r. Order of 
a point is different from the order of the curve. The order is the minimum integer number with 
which the point has to be multiplied to obtain O, in other words, rG = O. The curve parameters 
are thus completely defined by a, b, p, r, and G.  
 
 
4.4 Security levels of encryption algorithms 
 
Determining the security of an encryption algorithm is a difficult task to do. In determining 
whether the algorithm is secure a cryptanalyst studies the mathematical characteristics of the 
encryption scheme to find shortcut methods of decrypting the ciphertext. Mathematical 
treatment to find flaws is generally hard and the shortcut solutions to break the schemes may 
not be discovered. In order to ensure that the algorithm is secure, the algorithms are shared in 
communities and forums for open public scrutiny. 
 
The symmetric key algorithms described in section 2.1 are considered secure against differential 
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. The security of most symmetric key algorithms that have 
survived public scrutiny is evaluated in terms of size of the encryption key assuming that the 
best solution is only to do an exhaustive search on the possible keys. There are no known 
weaknesses of the algorithms. Daemen, (Hirani 2003) however discovered some 251 weak keys 
in IDEA which if used for encryption could be easily detected and recovered. However the 
likelihood of these keys being selected out of the 2128 keys possible is very low and can be 
prevented in the implementation of the algorithm itself. IDEA is generally considered very 




been around since 1997 and the Rijndael algorithm used in AES was proposed in 1999. Table 4 
below summarizes the characteristics of the symmetric key schemes discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Symmetric Key Encryption schemes 
 
For RSA the best-known attack is based on integer factorization problem. If it is possible to 
factorize p * q, then the secret key d and be easily derived. The attack against ElGamal scheme 
is solving the discrete log problem. The best-known algorithm for factoring and discrete log 
problem is Generalized Number Field Sieve (GNFS) (IEEE 2001, Cryptopp 2009). The solution 
to the GNFS algorithm has an asymptotic run time of exp(((1.923 + o(1)) ln(n)1/3 (ln(ln(n))2/3) 
where o(1) is a number that goes to zero as n increases and n is the modulus. This means the 
equation to obtain the same level of security as symmetric curve schemes can be written as 
follows: 
 
k = ((1.923 + o(1)) ln(n)1/3 (ln(ln(n))2/3 ; k is equivalent size of symmetric key 
 
For elliptic curves the best attack known is the Pollard-ρ algorithm. The asymptotic runtime of 
the algorithm is O( q1/2 ) where q is the order of the curve. IEEE 1363 (IEEE, 2001) states that 
the order of an elliptic curve is approximately equal to the prime p used for modulus. This 
implies size of be p should be at least 2 * k for security equivalent to k bits of symmetric key 
scheme. Table 5 below summarizes the relative strength of keys required for different types of 
algorithms. These are rough estimates taken from (Ferguson, 2003) based on the best-known 





Table 5: Key Sizes recommended for Security (Ferguson, 2003) 
 
It can be seen that the size in bits of RSA/DL schemes increases at a much rapid pace compared 
to elliptic curve schemes. The increasing key size leads to an increase in the size of the numbers 
being used in the system and hence the computational cost of operations on them. For the same 
reason is anticipated that elliptic curves without performing RSA and ElGamal in the near 
further. Hence a lot of attention is being paid towards elliptic curve as a viable alternative for 




Chapter  4  discusses  encryption  schemes  used  in  this  research  and  draws  comparisons 
between encryptions in symmetric, such as stream cipher, block cipher, DES, IDEA, CAST 
and  AES.  It  also  discusses  and  asymmetric  cryptosystems  such  as  RSA,  ElGamal,  and 

































When designing secure, extensible applications for mobile devices two crucial questions must 
be answered: 
 
1. What types of security policies can be expected to be enforced by the system, i.e. the 
device operating system? 
2. What class of mechanisms are needed to enforce these policies? 
 
Neither of these questions can be answered successfully without deep understanding of the area 
of enforceable security policies and the power of various enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The first major effort to define the category of enforceable security policies is due to Schneider, 
(Schneider, 2001). Schneider examined the security traits that can be enforced by a specific type 
of program monitor. These monitors can introduce itself between an un-trusted program and the 
device on which the program runs. Schneider monitor can observe the series of security-
relevant program actions one at a time, and if it identifies an action that will breach its policy, 
the monitor terminates the program. This method is very common since decisions about 
whether or not to terminate the program can depend upon the entire history of the program's 
execution. But, since these monitors can only terminate programs according, it is possible to 
define more powerful application aware security system. 
 
In this chapter, we examine the question of which security policies can be enforced at run time 
by monitoring the system state. Our overall approach differs from Schneider's, who used 
automata to model program monitors, in that we view program monitors as transformers that 
edit the stream of security policies to respond to various system conditions. 
 
 







Figure 12: A component diagram of the SSSM framework. 
 
This section researches dynamic reconfiguration of security policies in the context of dynamic 
adaptation. Various mobile device system parameters are classified to have effect on dynamic 
adaptation of security policies that differ in power and complexity. Therefore, we argue for an 
integrated framework that implements several system condition parameters and leverages 
Policies Repository compatible benefits by applying the appropriate one in a given situation. 
 
The percentage of mobile devices offering open platform functionality is likely to continue to 
rise as time moves on. Open platforms puts forward great advantages all elements of the mobile 
system by bringing the ability for flexible program and service delivery choices that may be 
installed, removed or restored many times according to the user’s needs and requirements.  
Nevertheless, open platforms allows unrestricted access to mobile APIs and resources by 
applications of un-trusted or unknown origin that could result in damage to the user application, 
the device, the network or all of these, if not managed by suitable security architectures and 
network security measures. Currently, mobile devices security is provided by most open OS 
mobile devices (Symbian OS, Microsoft, BREW, etc.). Recently, few industrial groups have 
also proposed recommendations including the GSM Association and Open Mobile Terminal 
Platform (OMTP). 
 
The challenging security and privacy demands of new portable devices are forcing fundamental 
approaches to solve complex security management problems.  This section presents a 
framework called System Monitor Security Management (for short, SSSM) which collects 
information about various system entities and dynamically optimise the security policies 
accordingly.  When a user starts an application on a mobile device, SSSM collects system 
information such as the available battery level, the application type, the required level of 
security, amongst others.  The collected information is fed into the Policy Engine module that 
uses complex algorithms to select a suitable policy or set of policies, e.g. encryption algorithm, 

































Repository module stores the system generalised security policies that represents a continuum 
of security-management policies and allows to dynamically adapt the policy in run-time 
manner, e.g. gradually shifting from highest security performance to minimum as the battery 
depletes.  The chosen security policy/policies are applied on all outgoing data streams to insure 
the desired level of protection.  During an application session, the same security policy applied 
on outgoing data streams is applied on received data to produce information in a particular 
format that can be utilised by the application or interpreted by the user. 
 
SSSM has the capability to adapt running security policies on run-time when a system state 
parameter changes. During SSSM execution, system state parameters can be changed 
continuously during the system-run.  SSSM receives dynamic system state updates and respond 
to changes that has a significant effect on the chosen security polices performance. 
 
In SSSM, one application session can have one or more security policies that mange the 
application events.  For example, when a user uses his mobile device to login into his network 
operator to buy calling credit security policy #1 can be used to manage the customer account 
login information exchange and security policy #2 can be used when the customer proceeds 
with the payment.  In this example security policy #2 provides higher level of protection as 
sensitive information, i.e. credit card information, is being transmitted. 
 
The System Monitor module can contain any number of parameters that describe the system 
conditions.  In this thesis we restrict our study to few important system conditions such as the 
energy and required application security levels.  The chosen parameters are the most significant 
parameters in a mobile device and application running on it.  These parameters will be used to 
evaluate the performance of the SSSM framework. 
 
In the following sections we discuss the components of the SSSM framework in greater detail. 
 
5.2.1 System Monitor 
 
This is an essential component of the SSSM framework.  It contains a set of parameters that 
precisely describe the current state of the system.  These are parameters of the hardware 
platform, e.g. battery level and available memory, of the mobile device as well as the software 
components of the system, e.g. application type.  System state is monitored at all times during 
the application run and various parameters are kept up-to-date. This component can contain any 
number of parameters that all/subset of them can be fed into the Policy Engine module to chose 




increases, the complexity of the selecting security policies increases. Therefore, in order to 
reduce the calculation and computation complexity, only those parameters that has effect on the 
choosing a suitable security policy are considered by the Policy Engine module. Information 
collected in this phase will determine the type of attack and the required security policies to 
prevent such attacks. 
 
Some of the important system state parameters are: 
 
1. Battery level: energy is a scarce and valuable resource for a mobile device, and 
managing it more effectively results in increased battery life, and, in the end, a 
competitive advantage.  Computation comes second after communication in energy 
consumption so it is always desired to reduces the computation complexity e.g. the 
number of encryption rounds. 
 
2. Application type: The classic challenge: security must be balanced against flexibility. 
Too much security and the system will be too inflexible for the type of rapid reaction 
required by today’s business environment. Depending on the specific requirements and 
the type of application, an application security assessment should typically consist of the 
discovery of information on the type of environment that exists in the mobile device and 
that at the server side as well (e.g. embedded SQL queries specific to a single database 
version). 
 
3. Time:  time is an important factor that must be dealt with carefully.  Some applications 
require rapid response time and long delays are not acceptable.  Time is a quality of 
service metric that includes the processing time at the Policy Engine module and the 
execution time of the chosen security policies.  The time complexity of a problem is the 
number of steps that it takes to solve an instance of the problem as a function of the size 
of the input, using the most efficient known algorithm. 
 
4. Level of security: different applications have different levels of security requirements. 
Level of security refers to processing data with different security clearances in the same 
system or network. 
We stress that the system can take any set of parameters but we restrict our framework 





5.2.2 Policy Engine 
 
A Policy Engine is a software component that executes one or more security policies in a 
runtime production environment.  A runtime environment allows applications to invoke security 
policies stored in the Policies Repository and execute them using the Policy Engine. The main 
function of the Policy Engine is to interpret stored policies, to construct the filters that are 
required, to implement the policies that map to the current system state and satisfy the 
application requirements.  The improved efficiency of application security through increased 
policy selection automation results in increased control over implemented security policies for 
compliance and better security management. 
 
The Policy Engine module detects and monitors the current conditions of the system software 
components as well as that of a host device hardware platform. Based on the detected and 
monitored conditions, the Policy Engine module coordinates security policies on the host device 
by configuring on-the-fly a plurality of functional polices supported by the host machine for 
performing various security related tasks. When monitored conditions permit a different 
configuration of security policies, the Policy Engine module on-the-fly reconfigures the 
deployed security policies. 
 
This component has access to the Policies Repository component to select the policy/set of 
policies that need to be applied for a specific action.  Security polices selected by the Policy 
Engine can be based on user input besides the information provided by the System Monitor 
module.  This allows the user input his preferences and makes a selection between two equal 
options.  User intervention is always required by the some device and/or applications to avoid 
situations such as a malicious application sends messages to premium services and run up a 
huge phone bill without the user detecting it. For example, when an internet connection is 
required most GSM mobile phones provide three options for the user to choose from: (1) Not 
allowed; (2) Ask every time; (3) Always allowed. 
 
 
5.2.3 Policies Repository 
 
Security policies are stored in the security provider database called “Policies Repository”. The 
security policy might come from legal regulation, company policy, or other sources. A security 
policy is composed of three components: Policy Conditions, Expressions, and Policy 




These policy conditions, along with the specific information the user supply for the condition 
(such as user name, or security role, or start/stop times), are called expressions. A policy 
statement is the collection of expressions that define who is granted access to a resource, and is 
therefore the main part of any security policy. The ability to use multiple expressions means 
that the user can create complex security policies that meet his application security 
requirements. The use of and and or between these expressions, as well as the ordering of the 
expressions, is also an important feature to define compound policies. 
 
This module contains a number of encryption algorithms that are suitable for various 
application types and provide different security levels. Different security algorithms can be used 
to encrypt different application data depending on the data sensitivity.  Chapter # provides a 
detailed study of the encryption algorithms studied in this thesis. Other security polices such as 
scan file for virus before download or forbid connection to websites that present a security 
threat can also be included in this component. 
 
The Interface is provided as a component of the Policies Repository which provides the ability 
to: register, define, classify, and manage all the security polices, verify consistency of policy 
definitions, define the relationships between different policies, and relate some of these polices 
to applications that are affected or need to enforce one or more of the policies. 
 
5.2.4 Policy decision and enforcement 
 
The policy decision module is separated from the policy enforcement module.  Since the 
decision module should provide a conflict resolution plan used by the policy enforcement 
module.  During the system lifecycle, initially consistent global policy may lead to 
unenforceable or inconsistent policies. Therefore, the policy enforcement needs to verify the 
selected policy rules against the security capabilities of the policy enforcement module. There 
are several relevant papers devoted to different techniques of conflict detection and resolution 
such as deontic logic (L.Cholvy, et. al.), dynamic conflict detection and resolution (N.Dunlop, 
et al.), policy conflicts specification and resolution (Morris Sloman, et. al.), detecting conflict of 
duty (D.Ferraiolo, et. al.), credential-based approach to specification of access control policies, 
conflict resolution in event-based policy management (Jan Chomicki), etc. 
 
 
Applications security covers action taken throughout the application's life-cycle to stop 
exceptions in the security policy of an application or the underlying mobile system 




and not which resources are assigned to them. They, in turn, resolve the use of these resources 
by users of the application through application security policies. 
 
In SSSM, all applications transitions must comply with the dynamically defined security 
policies. 
 
5.2.5 Receive Request 
 
Many applications that run on mobile devices interact with external software components or 
communicate information across the network.  For example, an email application can access the 
dictionary software that is located on the mobile device; after that the message is sent over the 
internet.  All communications sessions between the local application and the server for example 
are performed under an integrated security policy in both directions.  Since, it is possible to 
have different policies to control different application transitions, all outgoing and ingoing 
requests/messages are analysed under the security policy created for that session, e.g. use the 
same encryption algorithm to decrypt a message at the other end of a communication session. 
 
5.2.6 Received Data 
 
This is the output of processing all received requests/messages after processing under the 
security policies that corresponds to that interaction session.  An example is a decrypted 
message that an application received that needs decryption before further processing is possible. 
 
5.2.7 Policy enforcement 
 
In asynchronous distributed environments, enforcing appropriate security policies is more 
challenging task than defining and selecting of these policies. This is because security policies 
often depend on the actual information exchange among the distributed entities (the mobile 
device and the server), the order of events is not always defined, amongst other factors. In this 
section we study the difficulty in translating local policies to the entire distributed environment. 
We propose a mechanism for the enforcement of global security policies. The focus is on local 
events on specific node that has influence on the global state of the whole system. 
 
Different security events occurring on the mobile device or the server may move the whole 
system from a legal to an illegal global state. Both the server and the mobile device run a local 




state and policies defined by the system owner. The local system state is passed to the server 
that incorporates the state of the remote device to create a new global security state which 
combines the states of both nodes. For simplicity, we assume that a simple communication 
model in which the security mechanism is capable of detecting all the communication channels. 
We also assume that a mobile device communicates with the server only. If the device is to 
communicate with any other device, this happens through the server. 
 
Let P be an enforceable security policy that can be enforced by the local security system called 
Slocal. Slocal is used as input for the construction of the global security environment Sglobal. If 
a system has n parameters, then the system can have up to 2^n states (powerset construction).  
Thus, the Aglobal is based on the local state of the mobile device and the server. Let st be the 
state of the system at certain time. The global state at time t is denoted by Stglobal. Vector 
clocks (Mattern, 1989) are used to define the casual ordering of the security states. Each node 
maintains and updates its vector clock as described in (Mattern, 1989). Here, only security 
related events triggers vector clock update operations. 
 
When a local event happens on a device, the Policy Engine performs several operations. First it 
updates the system vector clock, and then it updates its state. If an event is undefined, then the 
latest action violates the system policy and the transaction (e.g. send/receive) is aborted. 
Otherwise, system generates a message that contains its state and vector clocks. The receiver of 
the message extracts the received information and updates its vector clock by selecting the 
maximal value for every entrance from both vector clocks. Therefore, the local vector clock 
associated with that particular channel represents the combined knowledge of both nodes and 
both nodes update their local states. 
 
However, sometimes, the nodes disagree on the negotiated security policy or the negotiated 
policy may contain inconsistencies. In this case, the nodes enter a second round of negotiation 
to resolve any conflicts. 
 
 
5.3 Experimental evaluation 
 
The experiment was conducted by studying the most common encryption algorithms used, 
symmetric algorithms such as IDEA, AES, and CAST, and asymmetric algorithms such as 
RSA, AlGamal, and Adobe leverages (RSA 512-1024, 2048). Crypto++, free C++ class library, 
was used as it has implementation for most of the popular cryptographic algorithms. It has 




SAFER, 3-WAY, GOST, SHARK, CAST-128, Square, Skipjack, Panama, ARC4, SEAL, 
WAKE, WAKE-OFB, BlumBlumShub, RSA, ElGamal, Nyberg-Rueppel (NR), Rabin, Rabin-
Williams (RW), LUC, LUCELG, DLIES (variants of DHAES), ESIGN, ECIES. The dedicated 
author Wei Dai actively maintains the library. 
   
In our research we used Cryptoo++ library and concentrated on evaluating IDEA, AES, CAST, 
AlGamal, RSA, and ECIES. Each algorithm was simulated on Windows XP based Toshiba 
SA30-203 P4 laptop, this enabled us to check all processes running for each algorithm, 
observing memory statistics and diagnosing the system logs in order to achieve a reflective 
indication of algorithms’ behaviours under dynamic environment. These results were analysed 
and interpreted to give us an adequate indication of battery power usage to compare it with the 
security level provided by each algorithm. The encryption libraries used in the experiments 
were treated as separate classes and not part of the library application to reduce the running 
time. However, the libraries can be optimised by assigning a fixed number of iterations as well. 
 
It is expected that the computation time would be closely related to the battery requirements; 
however, since the CPU utilization of power depends on parameters like voltage supply and 
capacitive load. The capacitive load on the CPU depends on the switching demand, which again 
depends on the instructions being executed. Hence, measurements for both the parameters are 
considered. 
 
The battery capacity keeps reducing with the number of times it is charged and discharged. 
Hence, care is taken during the experiments that the battery is not unnecessarily discharged too 
many times. Also to ensure that this effect does not affect the results, the measurements for a 
group of readings for one section are taken together. In all about 100 discharge cycles have been 
completed on the laptop would lead to reduction in capacity of 5% for Li-ion batteries that the 
laptop uses from the characteristics published by Toshiba. 
 
The experiments note the number of iteration or runs over the file and the battery life. So to 
restrict the number of measurements statistical properties were gathered by taking the difference 
in battery life left. Change in battery life divided by the number of runs gives the battery life 
consumed in percentage for one run. It was observed that since the charge and discharge cycles 
of the laptop were more or less linear and the memory effect that leads to non-linear discharge 





To demonstrate how the calculations were done consider Table 6 as an example of the 







Battery Left  
1 10 98 
2 20 97 
3 30 95 
4 40 94 
5 50 92 
Table 6: Sample table of observations 
 






Change in %  






1,2 10 1 0.1 
2,3 10 2 0.2 
3,4 10 1 0.1 
4,5 10 2 0.2 
Table 7: Sample table for calculations 
 
The average battery consumed per iteration can thus be calculated as follows 
 
Average battery Consumed per iteration = (0.1 + 0.2 + 0.1 + 0.2)/4 = 0.15 
 
Thus the statistics for reliability was gathered by taking every battery life change divided by 
runs to get battery life per run over the period of the experiment. 
 
5.4 Comparison of algorithms 
 
Purpose of this section of experiments is to see the trade-off in choosing secure algorithms and 





5.4.1 Symmetric Key Schemes 
 
We have reviewed of symmetric key schemes: AES128, CAST128, IDEA in chapter 2. All of 
these schemes provide 128 bits key encryption schemes and provide the same level of security 
as discussed earlier in section 2.2.3. However they have different performance in terms of time 
and battery requirements. Crypto++ library provides implementation of AES, CAST and IDEA. 
 
Programs are written with each scheme that record battery drain and time after encrypting a 
5MB file 10 times. Also a case where just the file is accessed and written to another file is 
considered to differentiate between the file access load and encryption load. In case of No 
Encryption and AES128 the minimum data block size accessed is 128 bits (16 bytes) while for 
CAST128 and IDEA the minimum data block size accessed is 64 bits (8 bytes). 
In secure communications architecture it should be useful to change the key size based on the 
battery power remaining in the system to reduce the load. Hence effect of varying key size to 
128, 192, and 256 bit keys is studies for AES algorithm. 
 
AES has 10 rounds for 128-bit key. It should be possible to change the number of rounds of 
encryption to make a quality to battery utilization compromise. Reducing the number of rounds 
would make the algorithm less secure but would have the advantage of being able to use the 






5.4.2 Asymmetric Key Schemes 
 
We have reviewed asymmetric key schemes: RSA, ElGamal, ECIES in chapter 3. Programs are 
written with each scheme that record battery drain and time after encrypting a 5MB file 10 
times. Also a case where just the file is accessed and written to another file is considered to 
differentiate between the file access load and encryption load. In case of RSA the test is further 





This chapter introduced a novel system state-aware framework that aims to automatically 
adapt security mechanisms according to the current state and conditions of various software 
and hardware components of the mobile, wireless system. SSSM is made up of many 
components; some components collect information about the current status of various 
hardware components and application requirements that is then used by another component to 
adjust the system behaviour to achieve optimality.  The performance of the SSSM framework 

































We consider various symmetric and asymmetric key schemes with different key sizes. The 
graphs for the results obtained are plotted in this section. The performance of the schemes and 
their implications has been analyzed in this chapter and suggestions have been made for 
designing energy efficient secure communication systems. The appendix section can be checked 
for actual numerical values that were obtained during the experiments. 
 
6.2 Symmetric Key Schemes 
 
The figure 13 below shows the battery consumed and the time consumed for iteration over a 
5MB file. The comparison is done between AES encryption, CAST encryption and IDEA all 
with 128 bits key size using Crypto++ library. The ‘No Encryption’ scheme represents the case 
where the file was just accessed and the data from this file was put into another file. This was 










Figure 14: Time Consumed per iteration by symmetric key schemes 
 
 
From the figure 14 we see that CAST128 and IDEA are more power hungry than AES128. The 
reason for this is that the algorithms employ different diffusion and confusion techniques. If we 
recall the implementation details of the AES, CAST and IDEA algorithms it can be seen that the 
major computationally intensive operations in them were 120 rotate bytes, 21 circular left shift 
and 34 multiplication operations per encryption assuming that addition, subtraction and XOR 
operations are relatively less intensive. CAST128 and IDEA process 64 bits at a time while 
AES128 processes 128 bits at a time. The time and the battery consumed are proportional to the 
complexity of operations per round and the number of data moves required making it difficult to 
state how much effect each type of operation has in the performance of the schemes. This is 
because data moves are difficult to analyze with different register allocations that can be done 
by the compiler and state of the operation system. 
 
Encryption of the plaintext data with AES128 causes increase in battery consumption by 75% 
and time consumption by 65%, when compared to the No Encryption scenario. CAST128 
consumes 58% and IDEA consumes 92% more battery than AES128. CAST128 takes 70% and 
IDEA takes 110% more time than AES scheme. The total energy of the Toshiba battery is 
58Wh. 
 
An immature approach to calculate the energy consumed per iteration over the file would be to 
multiply the percentage of battery consumed to 58Wh. For example, battery consumed by 
AES128 would be 0.00499 * 58 = 0.2377 Wh for processing 5 MB of data. In terms of security, 
there are no known attacks on the unmodified version of CAST and AES. IDEA however has a 






6.2.1  Key Size variation 
 
We compare the change in performance by using different key sizes for AES algorithm. For 
AES we consider the three different key sizes possible i.e., 128 bit, 192 bits and 256 bit keys.  
 
Figure 15: Percentage Battery Consumed with different Key Sizes for AES 
 
 
Figure 16: Time Consumption with Different Key Sizes for AES 
 
Increased key size leads to increased security as shown in table 4. In case of AES it can be seen 
that higher key size leads to noticeable change in the battery and time consumption. It can be 
seen that going from 128 bits key to 192 bits causes increase in power and time consumption by 
about 8% and to 256 bit key causes an increase of 16%. AES128 has 120, AES 192 has 144, 
and AES256 has 168 rotate byte operations, which implies 20% and 40% more operations for 
AES 192 and AES256 when compared to AES128. Although there seems an increase in power 
consumption that is directly proportional to the increased operations, the increase is less 




operations are performed has already been carried out. However, the increased power 
consumption of higher key size posses a compromise that should be considered before choosing 
the size of the key. For normal application 128 bits key is considered very secure hence going 
for higher key sizes would mean unnecessary wastage of resources for the added security that is 
actually not required. 
 
6.2.2  The effect of Changing the Number of Rounds 
 
The AES encryption scheme has 10 rounds for 128 bits key. It should be possible to reduce the 
number of rounds so that the amount of battery and time consumed while encrypting the data 
could be reduced. Figures 16 and 17 below show the comparison of energy and time consumed 
by the reduced round version of AES 128 bits key encryption. 
 
 
Figure 17: Percentage battery consumed by different number of rounds for AES 128 bit-key 
 
 





As can be seen from the graph by reducing the number of rounds from 10 to 4 rounds it is 
possible to save 13% of battery and time consumption and from 10 to 7 rounds is 3%. Reducing 
the number of rounds would decrease the security of the encryption. The NIST report on AES 
provides the work factor or operations and the memory required to attack the scheme under 
reduced number of rounds for 128 bits key size. No known attacks have been reported against 
the actual AES scheme with 10 rounds and the only way is through brute force which would 
take 2127 encryptions on an average. 
 
Rounds Operations Memory 
4 29 Small 
5 240 Small 
6 244 7*232 
7 2120 261 
10 2127 Not Known 
Table 8: Attacks reported on reduced round variants of AES with 128 bits key  
 
It can be seen that 4 round encryption with AES is not very secure and under most cases would 
not be preferred. Compromising the number of rounds leads to highly reduced security for 4 
rounds. As the number of rounds increase the security of the scheme improves, as can be seen 
from the table 8 above. There is likelihood of more attacks on the reduced round version of 
AES being discovered which increases the risk in using these schemes. The designer should 
consider the level of security required and the battery saving resulting from the performance 
improvements by reducing the number of rounds with extreme caution. 
 
6.3 Asymmetric Key Schemes 
 
In asymmetric key scheme RSA, ElGamal and ECIES are considered. The ECIES and ElGamal 
are hybrid schemes used in combination with symmetric key scheme in this case AES. The 
implementation of RSA used has OAEP standard for encoding then message with SHA for 
hashing. The RSA standard specifies the asymmetric key encryption but doesn’t specify how it 
can be used in conjunction with symmetric key schemes. The implementation is open to user. 
ElGamal scheme like RSA is also just encryption. It does not use any encoding or hash 
functions. ECC used here has XOR for symmetric key scheme and SHA (Stallings 1999, Delfs 
2007) as hash function. The secp160k1 curve provided by Certicom is considered for ECIES. 
For the purpose of the performance measurement the encryption is considered in units of 16 




storage space of 16 locations. In the case of Asymmetric key schemes the file size considered is 
1MB instead of 5MB as the processing with asymmetric keys is much more time consuming. 
 
 
Figure 19: Percentage Battery Consumption of Asymmetric Key Schemes 
 
Figure 20: Time Consumption of Asymmetric Key Schemes 
 
The figures 19 and 20 above show the performance of the schemes in terms of the time and the 
battery consumed without data transmission. We can see that for encryption, RSA is much more 
efficient than the ElGamal and ECIES schemes. In fact, RSA 1024 bits encryption is as much as 
17 times better than the ECIES 160 bits curve and 12 times better than the 1024 bit ElGamal 
scheme. RSA encryption is much faster than the other two schemes because it uses a short key 
for encryption, which is much smaller than the short exponent used in ElGamal. The exponent 
for RSA used in these experiments is 17 and can be represented in 5 bits while the short 
exponent in ElGamal is 164 bits. ElGamal encryption requires two exponentiation operations 
while RSA requires one. Also, the 160 bits elliptic curve multiplication in ECIES is costlier 
than the exponentiation of the short exponent in ElGamal. The assumption while making the 
statement is that the encoding schemes have a relatively low impact computational requirement 





In our experiments it is also essential that we consider decryption performance of the 
algorithms. Figure 21 below gives the graphs for decryption process of these algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 21: Percentage Battery Consumed by Asymmetric key decryption 
 
 
Figure 22: Time Consumption of Asymmetric Key Decryption 
 
It can be seen that in the decryption process ElGamal 1024 is the fastest scheme. ElGamal 
decryption requires only one exponentiation operation with a 164 bit short exponent. RSA also 
employs one exponentiation for decryption but it does not employ short keys, as short 
decryption key would make RSA insecure. The exponent in RSA is 1024 bits and in ElGamal is 
164 bits. Even after application of the CRT for RSA, which reduces the modulus size to 512 
bits, ElGamal is still more efficient. ECIES decryption requires two elliptic curve multiplication 
operations. Also ECIES 160 bits decryption is about 20% more efficient than RSA 1024 
decryption.  
 
Looking at the performance of the Asymmetric Key Schemes RSA is very efficient for 
encryption while ElGamal is the most efficient for the decryption process and should be chosen 




consumption with both encryption and decryption is considered. However, RSA and ECIES 
used here are more secure than ElGamal because they employ message authentication functions 
to ensure that messages decrypted are not invalid. 
 
6.3.1 Key Size variation 
 
We compare the change in performance by using different key sizes for RSA algorithm. The 
next figures show the performance of different key sizes of RSA. 512, 1024 and 2048 key sizes 
are considered. For encryption the file being encrypted was 1MB and for decryption the 
decrypted file was of 1MB. 
 
 
Figure 23: Percentage Battery Consumed with different Key Sizes for RSA without data 
transmission 
 
Increasing the security by increasing the key size in case of RSA has a higher cost. The curve 
shows that as the key size doubles the battery and time consumption requirements are more than 
double indicating a nonlinear growth in consumption with increase in key size. In Chapter 2 we 
have seen that the Processing time for RSA is proportional to 1.5 * k * O(N2), where k is the 
exponent and N is the size of the modulus. The exponent remains constant for encryption and 
the processing time is proportional to O(N2). However, for decryption the exponent depends on 
the key size and follows a third order growth proportional to O(N3) as k α N. Choosing 2048 bits 
security over 1024 bits security results in three times more energy consumption for encryption 




considered secure for normal applications until 2013. 2048 need only be chosen for highly 
secure applications. 
 
Figure 24: Percentage Battery Consumed with different Key Sizes for ECIES without data 
transmission 
 
The figure above shows the increase in battery consumption with increasing key size. For 
encryption the file being encrypted was 1MB and for decryption the decrypted file was of 1MB. 
The curves used for ECIES are the ones defined by Certicom. For 112 bits secp112r1 is used, 
for 160 bits secp160k1 is used and for 224 bits secp224k1 is used. There is increase in battery 

















1982 512 0.1047 1.2727 112 1.8918 2.258 
2013 1024 0.2372 6.2727 160 4.05 5.0769 
2055 2048 0.5833 39.5 224 7.0000 8.25 
Table 9: Comparison of percentage battery and time consumed by RSA and ECIES for different key sizes 
 
112 bits key of ECIES is equivalent to 512 bits key of RSA and 224 bits key is equivalent to 
2048 bits key of RSA. We have seen that ECIES decryption with 160 bits key is more efficient 
than RSA with 1024 bits key. For higher security requirements ECIES proves to be much more 
efficient for combined encryption and decryption performance. This is so because the key size 







This chapter shows the results obtained by testing AES, IDEA, CAST, RSA, ElGamal, and 
ECIES on Laptops. The differences between the mentioned encryptions are evaluated with 


























7 Handheld Devices 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
 
The Pocket PC and Handheld PC are considered in this experiment. The size of the file 
processed is 1 MB since these devices have much lower resources than the laptop.   
 
 
Figure 25: Percentage Battery Consumed by symmetric key schemes without transmission on 
Pocket PC 
 
On the Pocket PC, CAST128 consumes 22.14 % more power than AES128. Also encrypting 
data with AES128 is 50% more costly then just processing plaintext data. AES is still more 
efficient than CAST. AES256 consumes 9% more energy than AES128 and AES192 consumes 
5% more energy. RSA 1024 encryption is 29 times more costly than AES 128 encryption the 
Pocket PC. The results for RSA were shown separately in a table for better comparison of the 




   
Figure 26: Percentage Battery Consumed by symmetric key schemes without transmission on 
Handheld device 
 
On the Nokia 9300, CAST128 consumes 26% more battery than AES128. Encryption is 10% 
more costly than access just accessing data. AES192 consumes 4% and AES256 about 6% more 
battery than AES128.  
 
  
Table 10: Performance of Encryption Schemes on Laptop, Pocket PC and Handheld 
 
When compared to a laptop encryption 1MB on the laptop with AES128 would consume 
0.00082% battery, which implies that on the Pocket PC AES128 is 16 times costlier and 26 
times costlier on handheld Nokia 9300. The comparison made here is just in terms of the 
percentage battery and not the amount of energy consumed. The energy consumed on each 
device may give very different results but for practical applications the percentage battery 
consumed figure should be a much more relevant figure in making a decision about system 





more time to encrypt with AES128 encryption. The time consumed by handheld and Pocket PC 
is nearly the same. This is because the IPAQ was used with the expansion pack, which 
effectively provides the IPAQ with more battery power while that is not the case with the 
Handheld computer. 
 
Without the expansion pack the performance is expected to be similar for Pocket PC and 
Handheld device. The Nokia 9300 has a 206 MHz 32-bit StrongARM SA1110 processor with 
32 MB SDRAM that operates at 51 MHz with display area of 82.5 square centimeters. IPAQ 
HP 3870 also has a 206 MHz 32-bit StrongARM SA1110 processor but with 64 MB SDRAM at 
100 MHZ and a display area of 48 square centimetres. It can be seen that handheld has about 
twice the display area as Pocket PC and half the memory with the same processor. The access to 
data in the Handheld computer in much slower than that of the Pocket PC because of the slower 




7.2  Wireless Environment 
 
We consider the effect of changes in the communication environment by changing packet sizes, 
signal to noise ratio, and layer where encryption occurs. 
 
7.2.1 Data Transmission 
 
Figures below show comparison graphs for the same schemes with transmission of the data over 
the network. It has been noticed that the size of the data unit transmitted per unit time affected 
the results hence to remove that factor of variability from consideration two units of data were 
combined in the case of CAST and IDEA so that same amount of data is transmitted for all the 





Figure 27: Percentage Battery Consumed by symmetric schemes with data transmission 
 
Figure 28: Time Consumed by symmetric key schemes with data transmission 
 
The above graphs show the battery and time consumed per iteration over a 5MB file. From the 
chart it may be concluded that the encryption scheme used makes almost no significant 
difference in the energy and time consumption of encryption schemes. It can be seen that if we 
consider the 90% confidence interval for each of the case above we cannot say that either of the 
case is better than other. Most of the energy and time goes into transmission of data rather than 
encryption and since encryption and transmission are dependent on different resources the task 
that takes max time and resources dominates the results i.e., in this case transmission. 
 
The significance of the particular algorithm used would only come into picture when there are 
other computation intensive processes running parallel with the application using secure 
communication at application level, which by the data should be negligible. It is estimated that 




where data transmission can become faster than data access and encryption the importance of 
the encryption scheme used will be realized. In any case AES128 appears to be a better choice. 
 
 
Figure 29: Percentage battery consumed by different AES Key Sizes with data transmission 
 
 
Figure 30: Time Consumed by different AES Key Sizes with data transmission 
 
It can also be seen that with data transmission there is no significant difference between 
different key sizes for the AES scheme. The reason for this is attributed to the fact that data 
transmission requires much more battery than encryption. Hence, the additional computational 





Figure 31: Asymmetric Key Schemes Percentage Battery Consumption with data transmission 
 
 
Figure 32: Asymmetric Key Time Consumption with data transmission 
 
The figures 31 and 32 show the performance of the RSA, ElGamal and ECIES asymmetric key 
schemes with data transmission with 1 MB file. It follows that there is a  slight increase in the 
battery and time consumption requirements when compared to encryption without data 
transmission. It can thus be concluded that the asymmetric key scheme for data transmission is 
an important choice. In practical applications the asymmetric key schemes are expected to be 
used in parallel with symmetric key schemes. ECIES has inherent hybrid implementation. In 
case of RSA and ElGamal the user has to decide a hybrid scheme to be used with the 
asymmetric key scheme. The cipher size is 128 bytes for RSA 1024, 256 bytes for ElGamal 
1024 and 62 bytes for ECIES 168. Also the public key is 129 bytes for RSA, 408 bytes for 
ElGamal and 121 bytes for ECIES (Brown, 2000). The impact of choice of the asymmetric key 
scheme in such hybrid asymmetric key schemes for key setup is expected to be small when 




the encryption of a 1 MB file but practically the amount of data that would be encrypted would 
be 16 bytes during the symmetric key set up for 128 bits key. 
 
The asymmetric key scheme can however play an appreciable role in a hybrid scheme used for 
secure wireless communications when there is frequent key set up required. Also, not all 
applications transfer 1 MB of data. Many sessions would just require kilobytes of secure data 
transfer. In such cases the asymmetric key scheme would be a crucial choice. In is important 
that we consider the decryption performance of the schemes too. Because in setting up a secure 
communication session the encryption as well as the decryption process would be used. It is 
seen that the process of RSA decryption is 40 times more time consuming than data transfer 
with AES encryption. Added to that in protocols where the sender would have to wait till the 
decryption is acknowledged it leads to increased battery consumption on the sender’s computer 
due to idle time. 
 
In such cases when the communications is between the wireless device and a wired PC or 
Server where the public key decryption does not have to be acknowledged immediately before 
data transfer, it is preferred that we have RSA based encryption on the wireless device for 
transmission as ElGamal encryption with data transmission consumes 8 times more battery 
compared to RSA. While for decryption, we should use the ElGamal scheme as RSA scheme 
consumes about two times more battery power. When the communication is between two 
wireless devices, ElGamal would be preferred because both devices would then use equal 
amount of resources. 
 






When data transmission is also considered in case of RSA key sizes, the increase in battery and 
time consumption is much more compared to without data transmission. This is because as the 
key size increases the size of the encrypted data also increases. The encrypted data block is 64 
bytes for 512 bits key, 128 bytes for 1024 bits key and 256 bytes for 2048 bits key. This 
increase cipher block and requires more energy and time for transmission of the encrypted 
information. The choice between 2048 and 1024 bits key becomes even more significant in case 
of data transmission. 
 
 
Figure 34: Percentage Battery Consumed by symmetric key schemes with data transmission on 
Pocket PC 
 
In case of encryption with data transmission some amount of variation can be seen with 
increasing key size but the variation is less than the standard deviation of variance of the 
obtained results. Thus statistically it cannot be concluded that battery consumption increases by 
noticeable percentage with increasing key size with data transmission for Pocket PCs. However, 
it can be observed that encryption of data does have some impact on the amount of battery 
consumed even thought the impact is small. 
 
7.2.2 Signal to Noise Ratio 
 
The figures below show battery consumption when we transmit data under different signal to 
noise conditions. As it was not possible to maintain a constant signal to noise ratio the signal to 
noise ratio shown in the graph is the time average value of the signal to noise ratio over the 






Figure 35: Percentage Battery Consumed with different signal to noise ratio 
 
From the graph in figure 35, it can be concluded that as signal to noise ratio reduces the battery 
required for data transmission increases in a nonlinear fashion. Above 25dB signal to noise ratio 
the battery consumption is nearly constant. Results below an average of 10 dB SNR were not 
collected because it was difficult to maintain the TCP sessions at such a low signal to noise 
ratio. No definite conclusion can be made that the process of symmetric key encryption actually 
has some impact on the power consumption under different signal to noise ratios. 
 
7.2.3 Changing Packet Size 
 
In wireless communications the packets have headers of each layer. For smaller packet sizes the 
efficiency of information transfer is low because the ratio of the number of bits in header to 
number of bits of information is lower compared to the ratio in case of larger packets. Figure 
below shows the graph of battery consumption to packet size that was sent from application 





Figure 36: Percentage Battery Consumption with different Packet Size 
 
As can be seen the battery consumption is much high for packet sizes below 10 bytes. As we go 
to larger packet sizes the battery consumption starts to normalize. It is hence desired that 
applications aggregate data as much as possible before transferring it to the underlying layer for 
transmission. The performance in Figure 35 was obtained for signal to noise ratio greater than 
45 dB. It is expected that the performance characteristics will be different with less signal to 
noise ratio as the probability of error increase. Such a study is however suggested for future 
work and is not covered in this thesis. 
 
Implementing the SSSM mechanism will enable us to save time and energy when applying 
security measures, and when comparing our results to Pouwelse’ work which based on  
implementation of the Perfd processing component with EPS scheduling, we can measure and 
analyze the effectiveness of clock scheduling with the system workload in a given 
computational task. Pouwelse’ results show that EPS successfully schedules both applications 
and reduces the energy consumption of the processor with 50% when compared to running at 
full speed (236 MHz). This is a significant improvement over interval scheduling achieving 
33% reduction. Similar to  EPS, SSSM is expected to  reduce the system power with 25 % as 
the power efficiency improves significantly when  encryption algorithms are optimised to 







This chapter shows the results obtained by testing AES, IDEA, CAST, RSA, ElGamal, and 
ECIES  on  handheld  devices.  The  differences  between  the  mentioned  encryptions  are 































It is seen that AES is faster and more energy efficient than IDEA and CAST. When 
transmission of data is considered there is negligible difference in performance of different 
symmetric key schemes as most of the resources are consumed for data transmission rather than 
computation. Even under the scenario of data transfer it would be advisable to use AES scheme 
in case the encrypted data is stored at the other end and decrypted multiple number of times. 
Increasing the key size by 64 bits of AES leads to an increase in energy consumption by about 
8% without any data transfer and with data transfer the difference is not noticeable. Thus real 
time applications where data is just transferred between systems and not stored for future 
retrieval may prefer to have higher security provided by larger key size. Reducing the number 
of rounds leads to power savings but it makes the protocol insecure for AES and should be 
avoided. Seven or more rounds can be considered fairly secure and could be used to save energy 
in some cases. 
 
In case of asymmetric key systems for currently recommended key sizes, RSA encryption is the 
most efficient compared to ElGamal and ECIES. ElGamal is better than ECIES for encryption. 
For decryption ElGamal is the most efficient. Thus in applications that require decryption 
multiple numbers of times ElGamal would prove to be useful. ECIES decryption is better than 
RSA. For higher security requirements in the future ECIES would be much more efficient than 
RSA and ElGamal when combined performance of encryption and decryption is considered. 
Even with data transfer the asymmetric key scheme used dominates the energy consumption. 
Thus the choice of asymmetric key scheme for wireless communication is important. The 
process of encryption and decryption with Asymmetric key schemes is at least 100 times more 
costly than symmetric key schemes. 
 
On Handheld and Pocket PC devices the encryption operation is much more expensive than on 
the laptop. It is 20 times more expensive to do AES encryption on Pocket PC and about 26 
times on Handheld in terms of battery consumption. The size of the key has lesser effect on 
these devices. Data transmission is 20 times more expensive than just encrypting the data 
without transmission on Pocket PC while for laptop it’s 200 times more expensive than without 




percentage battery consumed per data byte transferred although the actual energy consumed 
may be the same. 
 
Implementing encryption at the software level results in considerable power savings up to 18%. 
Encrypting the message at software level with AES rather than WPA helps us get rid of the 
requirement to transmit the initial vector and also overcome the inherent insecurities of stream 
cipher. However, the security provided by the message integrity check of WEP was not 
included in the comparison.  
 
Signal to noise ratio doesn’t have any significant impact on the amount of battery consumed by 
the encryption scheme as can be seen from the result except when signal to noise ratio falls 
below 20dB. When signal to noise ratio falls below 20dB the battery consumption starts to 
increase rapidly. Wireless LAN communications systems should try to maintain an SNR of at 
least 20dB in order to achieve significant power sayings. 
 
Also the packet size should be kept large to make the communication efficient. Strategies like 
aggregation should be adopted whenever possible. Packet sizes should be at least more than 10 
bytes. Applications should aggregate data and transmit it as one packet as far as possible. 
 
In the future, optimizing the encryption schemes for wireless devices can be considered. The 
security of encryption at various levels of the OSI stack and its performance implications can be 
studied in further details. The performance characteristics of encryption schemes obtained in 
this research can be used to modify the existing protocols like SSL and IPSec for the wireless 
environment. Such a study could further be extended to develop security protocols for hybrid 
wireless networks. The performance of elliptic curve on handheld and pocket PCs could be 
studied, as it is expected that the performance of RSA exponentiation operation and elliptic 
curve multiplication operations would be different on the smaller devices. The performance 
equations derived for various encryption schemes could be used to develop simulation models 
to study the performance of encryption schemes on wireless devices and verify the results 
obtained in this research. 
 
 
8.2 Future Work 
 
From the SSSM framework, we considered several encryption schemes which might protect the 




to the SSSM such as virus scan engine, firewall, intrusion detection system, etc. In our future 
work, we will concentrate on developing similar framework to provide the users the opportunity 
to utilize the battery in the best way by managing all components responsible of draining the 
battery, such as, touch screens, Bluetooth, media players, etc. According to the users need, the 
software will prompt the user to which level of not only security level he requires, but also talk 
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No Encryption without 
 
transmission 




5 MB 0.004099 0.000202 100 291.952271 16.543851 100 
AES192 without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.004413 0.000216 100 312.218018 11.336117 100 
AES256 without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.004763 0.000266 100 336.186768 15.503484 100 
CAST128 without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.006468 0.000423 100 497.319611 13.704752 100 
IDEA without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.007871 0.000426 100 612.023499 12.488589 100 
No Encryption with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.149573 0.052860 100 12438.7636 158.216370 100 
AES128 with data 
 
transmission SNR=50 
5 MB 0.152506 0.053720 100 12483.6132 85.205696 100 
CAST128 with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.156463 0.054610 100 12483.5263 59.184216 100 
IDEA with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.152174 0.049953 100 12463.3681 59.967556 100 
AES192 with data 
 
transmission SNR=50 
5 MB 0.152506 0.053720 100 12433.8417 61.833210 100 
AES256 with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.155556 0.054433 100 12806.3662 68.565895 100 
RSA1024 without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 1.186441 0.389462 100 85194.5156 178.712845 100 
RSA2048 without data 
 
transmission 





















RSA1024 with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 1.75 0.433013 100 129654.24 1517.48437 100 
RSA2048 with data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 4.333333 0.471404 100 328717.123 14.262969 100 
RSA512 without data 
 
transmission 
5 MB 0.523809 0.120468 100 37583.035 162.182083 100 
RSA512 with data 
 
transmission 












5 MB 0.159091 0.049167 100 13560.41 13560.41 100 
No Encryption SNR=50 5 MB 0.149573 0.052860 100 12438.76 158.2163 100 
AES128 SNR=12.365 5 MB 0.295652 0.085863 100 33727.58 6676.237 100 
AES128 SNR=19.063 5 MB 0.21406 0.04146 100 21406.93 2412.26 100 
AES128 SNR=25.81 5 MB 0.159091 0.049167 100 13329.43 206.54847 100 
AES128 (4 rounds) 
 
without data transmission 
5 MB 0.003606 0.000219 100 257.257874 24.025738 100 
ElGamal encryption 1 MB 2.916667 0.41574 100 210631.234 2206.277 100 
ECIES 168 encryption 1 MB 4.533333 0.49888 100 323163.437 4770.0473 100 
AES192 SNR=11.869 5 MB 0.236000 0.055714 100 24391.7949 3744.0517 100 
AES192 SNR=27.3 5 MB 0.16207 0.042133 100 14686.2 211.98414 100 
AES128 (7 rounds) 5 MB 0.003972 0.000436 100 291.27449 43.4701 100 
ECIES with secp160k1 
 
curve encryption 
1 MB 4.0588 0.235294 100 300085.375 232.84497 100 
ECIES with secp224k1 
 
curve encryption 
1 MB 7.0000 .447214 100 514744.718 172.63105 100 
ECIES with secp112r1 
 
curve encryption 
1 MB 1.891892 0.310551 100 140375.26 392.91397 100 



























RSA 1024 decryption 
 




6.272727 0.445362 100 462858.09 262.0228 100 
RSA 1024 decryption 
 




39.5 NA 100 2945625.5 NA 100 
ElGamal 1024 decryption 
 




3.526316 0.499307 100 262782.34 361.68991 100 






8.25 0.433 100 614629.43 148.3981 100 
RSA 512 decryption 
 




1.272727 0.445363 100 93602.109 490.0623 100 




























#define block 16 
 









unsigned char data[block],cipher[block]; 
 







long fileSize = 0; 












if( argc != 5 ) { 
 








if( argv[1][1] != 'e' && argv[1][1] != 'n') { 
 








fin = fopen(argv[4], "rb"); 
 
if( fin == NULL ) { 
 








// Open a excel file with the current day and 
 




fp = fopen(logFile,"w"); 
 




























// Execute the loop till battery power falls to 30% 
 
for(i=0; i<rep; i++) { 
 




fin = fopen(argv[4], "rb"); 
 




































//Print the status into excel log file 
 











//Do this so that we dont lose data 
 
} 
 
 
 
fclose(fp); 
 
} 
 
